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**IN MEMORIAM**

VIOREL COLȚESCU (1938-2002)

*Ilona BÎRZESCU, West University of Timisoara*  
*Claudiu MESAROS, West University of Timisoara*

Professor Viorel Colțescu was born on April 28th 1938 in Butoiești, Mehedinți county, Romania. After graduating at “Traian” Secondary School in Drobeta-Turnu Severin he studied Philosophy at university of Bucharest (graduated 1960) where he finished also his PhD in 1976 with a thesis on *Philosophy of Culture in Lucian Blaga*. Between 1960 and 1966 he was appointed assistant in Philosophy for the whole Timisoara University Center. Beginning with October 1<sup>st</sup> 1966 he was entitled as assistant with lecturer degree for the new course in *History of Philosophy*, initially introduced as non-compulsory then transformed into compulsory lecture at Philology Faculty in Timisoara University. It was the first lecture ever given in History of Philosophy at Timisoara University. For 23 years he was the only to give this lecture in Timisoara superior teaching.

In 1970 he was established as lecturer by contest and in 1980 as senior lecturer. From 2000 to 2002 he was professor at Philosophy Department, University of Timisoara. He taught until March the 7<sup>th</sup> 2002 when he died. From 1990 he has also been Editor in chief at *Annales Universitatis Timisiensis, series Philosophia*.

The professor had his own skill in attracting and keeping together the best students and collaborators. Meeting professor Colțescu meant always meeting Philosophy, method, guidemark. His books and studies were born with difficulty under an exasperating rigour, far from the flippant fire of eagerness. His spontaneity was always coerced by a

vigorous and perseverant prudence as it happens only to superior spirits.

Before 1989 he published only studies and articles in reviews and collective books. It may be this prudence or maybe some art of discretion if not a visionary patience that kept him away from any compromise and mannerism. Anyway he never was a man of the moment, a “minute philosopher”. He rather preferred to consume his present in contemplating its classicism. And this is surely a sign of distinguished minds.

After coordinating a Spinoza edition (*On the Improvement of the Understanding*, Editura de Vest, Timișoara, 1992) he published two books and only prepared a third which he was short of days to finish.

Three directions could be traced in his research: philosophy of Blaga, philosophical historiography and Kant’s philosophy.

His doctoral thesis and part of the following studies dealt with the thinking of Romanian philosopher Lucian Blaga. They put a light on special aspects concerning genesis, evolution and originality of Blaga’s system. These works of professor Colțescu were in their turn fundamentals of academic studies, dictionaries and historical treatises of Romanian philosophy.

The second direction, historiography, gave professor Colțescu opportunity to defend the idea of a *philosophical* history of philosophy and justification of philosophy as knowledge and attitude, implying the intrinsic relation between philosophy and meta-philosophy. He also defended the epistemological value of history of philosophy. Regarding the textualist and contextual analysis, in all his lectures and works they have been developed and related to both the specificity of philosophical knowledge and creative use of new methods of language analysis (hermeneutics, semantics, pragmatics). Methodologically speaking the option for *textualism* is evident and it is corroborated with pragmatic-contextual analysis.

A third direction in profesor Colțescu’s scientific research is given by the last years preoccupation for philosophy and exegesis of Kant. He significantly contributed to interpretation of B Deduction, transcendental appearance and metaphysical deduction of categories. Some of his studies were quoted in *Kant-Studien* and *Proceedings of the Eight International Kant Congress*, Memphis, 1995.

Besides these three directions which he thought of as axiomatic for his entire career, professor Colțescu had other privileged themes. He constantly studied Rousseau’s philosophy (uniquely pointing out the ontological background of Rousseau’s critique of modern civilization), Spinoza (his preferred philosopher and whose destiny he admired

profoundly), Plato (the paradigmatic noblesse which gave professor Colțescu great moral landmarks). The lectures on Plato contain, by all evidences, the most recent lines written down by professor Colțescu before his long final sufferance.

We believe that the performance of his research is due to practicing a deep hermeneutics and deciphering of philosophical meanings, which has constantly been intersected by philosophical personal motivations, legitimating of problems and new styles.

He totally assumed the destiny of philosophy and received with profound interest and positive attitude the confrontation between modernity and post modernity; he relativised the opposition and hoped that nihilist rejection of modernity could be replaced in philosophical conscience by discovery of new positive connexions and unifying perspectives.

He has been a member of Cultural Society "Lucian Blaga" and "Kant" Society in Romania. This is the list of professor Colțescu's works as he had personally given a few weeks before death, as he was to be entitled to conduct doctoral theses. The expected news came one day before death.

### **I. Books**

*Filosofia și istoria ei (Philosophy And Its History)*, Editura de Vest, Timișoara, 1996, 195 p.

*Immanuel Kant. O introducere în filosofia critică (Immanuel Kant. An Introduction To Critical Philosophy)*, Editura de Vest, Timișoara, 1999, 167 p.

*Istoria filosofiei. Filosofie veche, medie și modernă (History Of Philosophy. Ancient, Middle and Modern)*, Editura Universității de Vest, Timișoara, 2002 (postum).

### **II. University courses**

*Introducere în istoria filosofiei (Introduction To History of Philosophy)*, Tipografia Universității din Timișoara, 1982, 232 p.

*Immanuel Kant. Curs special (Immanuel Kant. Special Course)*, Tipografia Universității de Vest, Timișoara, 1996, 161 p.

### **III. Published papers (reviews and collective volumes)**

„Probleme de teoria și metodologia istoriei filosofiei (Problems In Theory And Methodology of History of Philosophy)” in *Existență, cunoaștere, valoare*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, 1970, p. 20-32.

„Problema categoriilor în filosofia lui Blaga (Problem of Categories in Blaga's Philosophy)” in: *Studii de filosofie*, vol. I, Timișoara, 1971, p. 63-74

„Semnificația antropologică a culturii în filosofia lui Blaga (Anthropological meaning of culture in Blaga's Philosophy)”, in: *Studii de filosofie*, vol. II, Timișoara, 1975, p.77-92

„Filosofia culturii la Blaga” (Philosophy of culture in Blaga. Abstract of Doctoral thesis), București, 1976, 25 p.

„Kant, critic al idealismului – I (Kant, criticiser of idealism, I)”, in: *Analele Universității din Timișoara (AUT)*, Seria Științe Sociale, nr.1, 1976, p. 11-14

„Kant, critic al idealismului –II (Kant, criticiser of idealism, II)”, in *AUT*, Seria Științe Sociale, nr. 1-2, 1977, p. 5-8

„Lucian Blaga și drumul său în filosofie (Lucian Blaga and His Philosophical Journey)”, foreword to: Lucian Blaga, *Încercări filosofice*, Editura Facla, Timișoara, 1977, p. 5-28

„Critica rațiunii pure-200 de ani de la apariție (Critique Of Pure Reason – 200 Years From Publication)” in : *AUT*, Științe Sociale vol. VI, 1981, p. 11-20

„Cu privire la respingerea kantiană a idealismului (On Kant's Rejection Of Idealism)”, in *Revista de filosofie*, nr.4, 1981, p. 462-467

„Valențe dialectice ale concepției contractualiste a lui J.-J.Rousseau (Dialectical Dimension Of Rousseau's Contractualism)” in: *AUT*, Științe Sociale și Economice, vol. 2, 1983, p. 9-17

„Funcția critică a filosofiei în gândirea tânărului Marx (Critical Function Of Philosophy in Marx)”, in: *AUT*, Științe Sociale și Economice, vol. 3, 1984, p.1-7

„Conceptul de aparență transcendențială la Kant (The Concept of Transcendental Appearance in Kant)”, in: *AUT*, Științe Sociale și Economice, vol. 4, 1985, p. 11-20

„Sinn und Bedeutung bei Kant”, in *Revue Roumaine des Sciences Sociales*, Série de Philosophie et Logique, tome 29, nos. 3-4, 1985, p. 301-307

„Cu privire la interpretarea ontologică a apriorismului (Concerning Ontological Interpretation of Apriorism)”, I, in *AUT*, Științe Sociale și Economice, vol. 6, 1987, p.1-6

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„Cu privire la interpretarea ontologică a apriorismului (Concerning Ontological Interpretation of Apriorism)”, III, in *AUT*, Filosofie și Științe Socio-Umane, vol. III, 1991, p.3-9

„Lucian Blaga și morfologia spengleriană a culturii (Lucian Blaga and Spenglerian Morphology)”, in: *Lucian Blaga – cunoaștere și creație*, Cartea Românească, București, 1987, p. 357-379

„Cu privire la statutul teoretic al filosofiei moderne a limbajului (On Theoretical Statute of Modern Philosophy of Language)”, in: *Revista de filosofie*, nr.1, 1989, p. 40-49

„Textul filosofic – punct de plecare în istoria filosofiei (Philosophical Text: The Depart in History of Philosophy)”, in: *Forum*, Revista universitarilor din România, nr.10, 1990, p. 73-81

„Finalitatea fără scop (Finality Without Object)”, in: *Revista de filosofie*, nr. 3-4, 1992, p. 177-181

«L'apparence transcendental» in vol: *Kant and the Transcendental Problem. International Symposion*, Faculty of Philosophy, Bucharest, 1991, p. 28-41

„Metoda la Spinoza (Method in Spinoza)”, foreword to Spinoza, *Tratat despre îndreptarea intelectului (On the Improvement of the Understanding)*, Editura de Vest, Timișoara, 1992, p. 5-26

„Limbaj și intenționalitate (Language and Intentionality)”, in: *Studia. Philosophia, Historia, Philologia*, vol. I, Tipografia Universității de Vest din Timișoara, 1992, p. 5-20

«L'idée de la transcendance dans la philosophie de Lucian Blaga», in *Analele Universității de Vest din Timișoara (AUVT)*, Seria Filosofie, vol. VI, 1995, p. 5-10

«Concepts purs et intuitions chez Kant», in *AUVT*, Seria Filosofie, Vol. VIII, 1996, p. 21-30

“Presuppositions of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Categories”, in *AUVT*, vol. XI, 1999, p. 25-36

#### **IV. Coordination of Reviews and collective books**

*Studii de filosofie (Studies in Philosophy)*, I, Timișoara, 1971.

*Studii de filosofie (Studies in Philosophy)*, II, Timișoara, 1975

*Orizont*, (member of editorial board, 1985-1990)

*Analele Universității de Vest din Timișoara*, Seria Filosofie, (chief editor from 1990)

*Bicentenarul Criticii facultății de judecare. Studii (Bicentennial of Critique of Pure Reason)*. Tipografia Universității din Timișoara, 1991 (coordination, foreword)

#### **V. Articles and book reviews (selection)**

„Prometeismul filosofiei (Prometeism of Philosophy)”, in *Orizont*, nr.8 (223), 1972

- „100 de ani de la moartea lui L. Feuerbach (100 years from Feuerbach's Death)” in *Orizont*, nr.8 (223), 1972
- „Semnificația istorică a criticismului kantian (Historical Meaning of Kantian Criticism)”, in *Orizont*, nr.17 (321), 1972
- „O influentă orientare spiritualistă-neotomismul (An Influent Spiritualist Current)”, in *Orizont*, nr. 36 (340), 1974
- „Descartes – erou al rațiunii (Descartes – Hero of reason)”, in *Orizont*, nr.8 (364), 1975
- „Platon, Opere vol. I (Plato, Works, vol. I)”, in *Orizont*, nr.12 (368), 1975
- „Lucian Blaga. Periodizarea activității filosofice (Lucian Blaga: Periods of Philosophical Activity)”, in *Orizont*, nr.16 (387), 1975
- „Libertate și responsabilitate (Freedom and Responsibility)”, in *Orizont*, nr.16 (371), 1975
- „Filosofie și acțiune (Philosophy and Action)”, in *Orizont*, nr. 51 (634), 1984
- „Teoria formelor culturii la P.P.Negulescu (Theory of Forms of Culture in P. P. Negulescu)”, in *Orizont*, nr.16 (1000), 1986
- „O exegeză unitară (A Unitary Exegesis)”, in *Orizont*, nr.35, 1986
- „Ontologie și praxis (Ontology and Praxis)”, in *Orizont*, nr.31 (1066), 1987

#### **VI. Presented papers(selection)**

- „Conceptul de valoare în filosofie (Concept of Value in Philosophy)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University, 1966
- „Problema stilului culturii în filosofia lui Blaga (The problem of Style in Blaga's Philosophy)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University, 1970
- „Dimitrie Cantemir și aristotelismul (Dimitrie Cantemir and aristotelism)”, Scientific Symposium, dedicated to the tri-centennial of D.Cantemir, Timișoara University, 1973
- „Cu privire la primul volum al tratatului de *Istoria filosofiei românești*. Probleme metodologice (On the First volume of the Treatise of *History of Romanian Philosophy*. Methodological Problems)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University, 1973
- „Preliminarii la o lectură ontologică a primului Discurs al lui J.-J.Rousseau (Preliminaries to an Ontological Lecture of the First discourse of J.-J.Rousseau)”, Memorial Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University, 1976
- „Metoda istorico-genetică în '*Discurs asupra inegalității*' al lui J.-J.Rousseau (The Historical-Genetical Method in *Discourse on Inequality* by J.J.Rousseau)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University, 1978

„Lucian Blaga și concepția despre cultură a lui O. Spengler (Lucian Blaga and Conception on Culture of Oswald Spengler)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University, 1970

„Problema alienării umane în ‘*Discurs asupra științelor și artelor*’ al lui J.-J. Rousseau (The Problem of Human Alienation in *Discourse on Sciences and Arts* by J.J. Rousseau)” Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University, 1980

„Apriorismul în dezbaterile filosofice actuale (Apriorism in Recent Philosophical Debates)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University 1981

„Dialectică și politică în gândirea lui J.-J.Rousseau (Dialectics and Politics in Thinking of J.J. Rousseau)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University, 1982

„Dialectica interiorității umane în scrierile autobiografice ale lui J.-J.Rousseau (Dialectics of Human Interiority in Autobiographical Writings of J.J.Rousseau)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara University, 1983

„Teoria kantiană a sintezei a priori în dezbaterile filosofice actuale (Kantian Theory of A Priori Synthesis in Recent Philosophical Debates)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara Technical University “Traian Vuia”, 1983

„Cu privire la stadiul actual al cercetării filosofiei lui Blaga (On Contemporary Research of Philosophy of Lucian blaga)”, Scientific Symposium, Timișoara Technical University “Traian Vuia”, 1985

„L. Wittgenstein și originile filosofiei moderne a limbajului (L. Wittgenstein and the Origins of Modern Philosophy of Language)”, Annual Scientific Symposium of Social Sciences Centre, Timișoara 1987

„Teoria intenționalității la J. L. Searle (Theory of Intentionality in Searle)”, Annual Scientific Symposium of Social Sciences Centre, Timișoara 1988

„Conceptul de câmp stilistic la L. Blaga (The concept of Stylistic Field in Blaga)”, Annual Scientific Symposium of Lucian Blaga Society, Cluj, 1992

«Le déduction kantienne B des categories», International Symposium ‘Etre et Logos’, Timișoara, 1996

„Presupoziții ale deducției transcendente kantiene a categoriilor (Presuppositions of Transcendental Deduction of Categories in Kant)”, Scientific Symposium, ‘Zilele academice timișorene’, Timișoara, 1999

„Noi puncte de vedere asupra deducției metafizice kantiene a categoriilor (New Perspectives on Metaphysical Deduction of Categories in Kant)”, Scientific Symposium, ‘Zilele academice timișorene’, Timișoara, 2001

\*

And why not, as a last notice: if anyone would wonder “What did professor Colţescu fear of?” – the answer could be that he had no fear of death. He seemed to be expecting it in one of his last days and contemplating it in Schopenhauerian maxims. What he had fear for was the frivolity of actuality. I do not know what he could say – wonder if he had not actually – about the “actuality” of those who tired his youth. But here is what he said about the hurrying actuality of iconoclast postmodernism:

*“Modernity has been criticised many times and from various points of view. We should not forget that (...) the process of modern civilisation has begun in the eighteenth century. Modernity, time of critic spirit, has encouraged itself this form of reflexive critique named self-contestation. Every time modernity proved itself capable not only of supporting criticism but also of extracting from criticism new forces for its own development. Consequently the actual situation is less dramatic than it may seem sometimes. Maybe the ‘European cultural model’ extending nowadays to planetary dimensions is, finally, the work of modernity and is more resistant than some believed when hurried to sing its requiem”* (Viorel Colţescu, *Philosophy and Its History*, Editura de Vest, 1996, p. 192).

A MODERNIST OUTLOOK TO THE WORK OF G. W. LEIBNIZ

*Georgina Oana GABOR*  
West University of Timisoara

This study proposes a possible interpretation of G. W. Leibniz's *Monadology* that places the author in an insightful relation with the twentieth century's modernism<sup>1</sup>. I am very much aware of the risks of such an endeavor: to fall pray to using the text of *Monadology* exclusively as a *pre-text* for some "personal" statements that may be plausible but, being autonomous from the reference, are also abusive. Nevertheless, the temptation for undertaking such an approach to Leibniz's capital work finds its validating prompters in the manner in which the modern "categories" of *difference*, *repetition*, and *mise en abyme* apply to the constitutive elements of his philosophical system. If one aims to study the development of human thought as it proceeds from a "traditional" paradigm towards a modernist outlook, examining the way in which Leibniz discusses and materializes (*avant la lettre*) these "modern themes" (leave aside the oxymoron comprised in this very phrase) could not be futile. Yet, this examination should avoid not only the elaboration of some modern "portrait" of the philosopher, but also his work's implacable condemnation to exclusively traditional interpretations. While ceaselessly trying to avoid abusing the corpus of *Monadology* in any of the ways mentioned above, I pose the question: Is there any element missing from G.W. Leibniz's work, that would allow the critic to infer that, *because of that lack*, Leibniz could not be considered a modern thinker?

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<sup>1</sup> All over this paper, by "modernism" I understand the twentieth century's (*aesthetic*) modernity, which begins with authors such as Dostoievski, Baudelaire, and Nietzsche, and that essentially differs from the historical modernity initiated by Renaissance.

My first observation proposes that the world outlook that *Monadology* sets forth remains a metaphysical one; it is grounded in metaphysics. In this world, the epistemic subject fulfills its mandate as such in the process of discovering (*identifying*) the metaphysical foundations, the “roots” of the world in which it exists. Its cognitive prerogative consists of continuous adjustment to a *given* state of the world. The individual monad behaves as a member of a coherent whole. Because of its inneist cognitive status, the individual monad has access to the states of this “whole” of which it comprises a part. Hence the monad has the capacity to obtain spontaneous representations of the successive states of any other monad and therefore, representations of the successive states of the world as a whole as well.

Leibniz holds a double view on this issue. He certainly cannot forego the idea of cosmic *unity* of the universe. That is why he brings the universe *as a unit* in the conscience of the specific monad. On the other hand, the individual epistemic subject (the spirit monad) has the *opportunity* to find itself helpless when trying to “own” this unity in virtue of sole cognitive capacities. While from an epistemological point of view the monad’s *nature*, which consists of *its capacity to represent functional relations between monads*, allows it to “possess” the universe, from an ontological perspective the real possession belongs, traditionally, to God. A God who, paradoxically, is neither immanent to (identical with) the universe, nor he transcends it. God is a ... monad. This becomes less paradoxical if we invoke the words of Leibniz himself:

"Not in their object, but in the way the object is known are the monads limited. All of them show a confused tendency towards the infinite, to the wholeness, but they all are limited and differ from each other in the extents to which their perceptions are distinctive" (Leibniz, p. 520).

This type of ontology in which substances’ (perfectly heterogeneous!) hierarchy is established according to the ineffable criterion of their cognitive capacity obviously brings about an innovation: it concerns the hierarchy of substances *as such*. This observation follows from the fact that the representative nature of the monad does not provide information about a supposed *initial state* of the ontological relation between monads, but it provides *this ontological relation itself*. Furthermore, this relation, by changing its terms – that is, the successive states of the coexistent monads – remains *at the same metaphysical level*. The idea is grounded on the premise that monads’ representations change incessantly and endlessly and also on the fact that the moment of creation constitutes God’s answer to the specific needs of *each*

monad. Such an answer translates into monads' mutual adjustment to each other. It constitutes an ontological prime state *of the same nature* as the following states, because there are no later modifications in the extant relations among monads. The monads "lack windows".

Using these provisional data, I try to establish the manner in which the concept of *difference* emerges from Leibniz's work. What concept of difference do we encounter here? Vattimo (1996) considers that the chances to achieve real knowledge with regard to "the difference-as-difference" are precarious, yet it is compulsory for the epistemic subject not only to be aware of its existence, but also to keep posing the *problem of difference*. Language itself misses its possibility to give an account of difference-as-such because it confines notions to mere concepts. The *difference per se* proposes itself as the ontological counterpoint of the metaphysical foundation. This is why difference constitutes a modernist nostalgia. Vattimo also points out that metaphysics cannot be surpassed unless along with the epistemic subject's (to which it constitutes simultaneously a foundation and a "product") abolition as such. Thought that divests itself of any metaphysical foundations stops being real. It becomes "delirium" or automatism of its technological objectifications. Therefore, difference, as an object of thought becomes groundless mental oddity, which lacks any relation to the reality of the subject *as a whole*.

"Thought that does not want to be founding in the metaphysical sense of the word, but which remains thought" (Vattimo, p. 212)

constitutes a postmodernist, more plausible resolution for this dilemma. Could that be some thought that deals with elements that come and go, playing an incessant "game", never identical to themselves, and tirelessly objectifying "difference-as-difference"? Elements that still exist, at least for as long as they constitute *objects of thought*? Deleuze (1995) remarks:

"The law unifies the change of waters with the permanence of the river" (p. 14).

One could imagine thought to be such a *law*. In the case of Leibniz's system, the monad constitutes an unfolding of its different states in time. The *difference-as-difference*, which *differs* from the objective row of these states, exists in the form of an *animating principle* of the monadic system. The epistemic subject ignores this principle; it constitutes a divine privilege. However, it is remarkable that Leibniz was able to conceive the *difference-as-difference*. What gets between his concept of

God and this God's "thoughts"? The entire created world, comprised of monads. That happens because God's thoughts turn into actions instantaneously. Leibniz, still indebted to tradition, cannot dispense from such a concept of divinity. God's thought (considered independently from action) makes him similar to the modern epistemic subject (God conceives the difference-as-difference). Yet, any other monad's effort to comprehend the world takes place within the metaphysical frame established by God. Of course, according to the principle of sufficient reason, not *all* of God's thoughts become objective reality. However, the conclusion remains plausible: *Monadology* previews, in its description of the divine monad, a certain attribute of the aesthetic modernity.

From a different standpoint, a monad does not constitute the "similar" for another (as if both were encompassed by a common genre), because similar entities are interchangeable. Yet the monads cannot replace each other. Also, a monad cannot be "the equivalent", "the same", or "the identical" of another. By adding one monad to another one doesn't get *two* elements of the same kind, but the universe as it appears from two different points of view. In other words, the monadism constitutes an ontology that consists of *the repetition of the monad*. Being its creator, Leibniz's God is likely to achieve a new . . . modern facet.

Still from another perspective, a monad constitutes *the mirror of the universe*. The universe, as a macro-unit, contains the monad that, in its turn, "possesses" the universe, and therefore *itself*, but in a different manner. Imagination brings about the concept of *mise en abyme*, a concept that Gide (1970) identified in heraldic procedures, in 1891:

"I enjoy seeing in a work of art the subject itself transposed at the characters' level. Nothing enlightens better and more reliably the ensemble's proportions. Hence, in some of Memling's or Quentin Metzys' pictures, one convex, dark little mirror reflects, in its turn, the inside of the room in which the scene depicted takes place" (Gide, p. 27).

Dällenbach (1977) insists on the *mise en abyme's* formal framed statute. By spurring a text's (even repeated) auto-reference, the *mise en abyme* does not provide it with some speculative, privileged meanings, but it points out the text's macrostructure, making it intelligible:

"Its (*mise en abyme's* – m.n.) essential property consists of pointing out the intelligibility and the formal structure of the work" (Dällenbach, p.16-17).

"The word *abyme* is a *terminus technicus* here",

Dällenbach continues.

“Therefore, to speculate its strong associative powers and to pre-connect it to some metaphysics should be avoided” (Dällenbach, p.18).

Still it is noticeable that this formal application of the *mise en abyme* procedure to Leibniz’s monadism is not a strong enough quality to make of the work a “modern” construction. The concept of *being mirrored* is typically traditional. This quandary won’t be ironed out until *two* different kinds of *mise en abyme* are being posed: a “traditional” one (for which *Hamlet* stands as a good example) and a “modernist” one. The difference between the two is the difference of *informational content* between the micro-text put “into abyme” and the text itself. The distinction seems proper given that the perfect identity of the two levels’ informational contents (that together provide the recursive sequence of the *mise en abyme*) can be thought to appear *futile* or *redundant* to the modern thinker. The micro-text should own an irretrievable autonomy since its moment of inception.

In these conditions, a valid question reads: Does the “diminished image” of the whole bring about an increase in knowledge or, on the contrary, it limits the access to the respective whole? Can one speak of a feedback process between the two levels, which would consist of mutual clarification between the two? Obviously, the modern thinker can ascribe the contents’ non-identity to a *factual impossibility*. If we consider a depicted image, the *mise en abyme* appears merely as a signal/ sign. The painter cannot reproduce it properly. Maybe he/ she can apply the procedure once or twice. Yet, even if the matter is, as Leibniz thinks, infinitely dividable not only in principle, but also in act, the thinker can perform the process of division merely in his mind. Conveying it into a significant and autonomous language (e. g., a chromatic language) is not a feasible activity.

Retrieving their incapacity to effectively materialize the technique of the *mise en abyme*, even though they have conceived it, the modern thinkers “divest” themselves of it. From this moment on, the *mise en abyme* detains its own autonomy and therefore, it owns contents that surprise the author himself. On the other hand, there is also the -- rather postmodernist -- option to consider the difference of content mentioned above be the guarantee of the possibility of an endless semiotic process exercised upon the text put “en abyme”. The postmodern thinker does not deem any of the elements’ contents irreducible (from a metaphysical

point of view), precisely because they are, in their turn, endlessly divisible by means of thinking. Hence, the difference of content becomes the way in which the human beings retrieve the infinite by means of thinking. While traditionally *to act/ to create* constitutes the divine verb, modernity declares that *to act* has often nothing in common with *to think*.

This essay's argument is that *Monadology* affords the reading of a double *mise en abyme*. Leibniz's *mise en abyme* consists of divine thought, which becomes deed, and therefore, metaphysics ideally materialized. "Being mirrored" is perfect in God's mind, so it is perfect in his ontology. Again, the modern element is *God the thinker, not the one who acts*, and therefore, not God in its entirety. Leibniz seems to give up any modernist claims, while he attributes them -- as positive attributes -- to God. By presupposing God's existence and by appealing to metaphysics, Leibniz escapes from the actual infinity's "terror", which, he believes, *cannot be described* by the human epistemic subject: it is God's prerogative. The modernist turning point, which Leibniz does not take, consists of this *human understanding* of the infinite. Modernist thought, while it needs ontological elements only in order to divest of them incessantly, does not need a God to solve its impotencies. Modernist thought engages in an endless "game", which does not turn its objects into metaphysical elements for fear that the game would be ruined.

If Leibniz had said:

"I am the God that I invented",

he would have resembled Nietzsche. There appear, in his system, a series of modernist facets, but Leibniz does not release them; he transfers them to the divine principle. Therefore, it is difficult not to bias some interpretation of his philosophy. There are monumental intuitions in Leibniz's work, which he dispenses from by making a huge, groundless "pounce" -- that still bears the imprint of his époque -- into a resolution that appeals to the divine. Yet, Leibniz invented a modern God. This "product" transfigures and overtakes his creator. Leibniz the philosopher submits to his own *need* for divinity, while his God continues his sinusoidal travel that would eventually become the rout for the epistemic subject of the twentieth century's modernity.

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A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO A SPIRITUAL MASTER'S  
PORTRAIT

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*“Augustin says in his book ‘De Genesi contra Manichaeos’ that, like the earth that, before sin, has been wetted by a spring, and, after the sin, needed the rain that was falling from the clouds, man’s spirit, symbolized through earth, has been enriched by truth’s spring before sin, after it, needs other ones’ knowledge, the same way it needs the rain falling from the clouds”.*<sup>1</sup>

Speaking about crises has become a commonplace today. The individual is crossing existential crises, the inter-human relationships define themselves in order to pass over all kind of crises as well as the scientific or politic paradigms that are deficient face to the growing strange and diverse challenges of the living world. The laments and the therapeutic attempts became such natural presence that seems to banter the very definition of a crisis. Basically, no crisis is uncommon and neither should be. *“We descend and we do not descend in the same flowing water”*. Any flow is an overflow of a crisis, of a solution or an illusion. Flowing water is a continuous process, meaning a continuous denial of what already exists. A restless cross of a border between a fulfilled stage and an unknown horizon never met but still searched. All that seems to be, at once, a solution will be denied, in the very coming stage. This is the manner in which time’s passing can be justified. Time’s getting old does deny all that it meets in his way. In other terms, it brings an unexistent element; something semantically unperceived that created the feeling of insufficient, unadequated in respect to what already exists. This means that being in a crisis is the consequence of being in time, namely in a permanent alteration. There is no inopportune individual, no paradigm being just morally worn out. The attitudes define a moment

that was not enough for it, generating a flow and thus, context's modification. In the very context when two subjects think they are passive as related to a situation, the unwritten 'contract' between them and their own becoming does modify one of the clauses, implying the continuous adaptation of the solutions. As it follows, time is responsible for the essential inadequations of being even in those cases where the other instances prove to be not guilty. Time follows being, creating original combinations of challenges and land-marks.

As a consequence, *being in a crisis* means being in time, being conscient of the continuous borders changing, namely in the situation of a redefining of ones own life. The one who stops – even for a moment – from a certain attitude or interpretation of his own road, risks to lose the very essential of the flow - that is mobility – and to become very rapidly, inadequate with himself.

On another hand, individual's soul is not just water, flow, mobility, it is also earth<sup>2</sup>.

“God makes the humidity to mount from deep to the clouds in order to soften earth and create man”.<sup>3</sup>

Earth is considered to be a “heavy substance”, less receptive, less adaptable. Trough its “density”, earth tries to impose a delay to the becoming process, and also a contemplation of what already exists, a 'stop of time'. The soul, as a residence of feelings, is the most vulnerable element and can justify in any moment some kind of being's narcissism inside an individual. The more emphasized and argued is this in the inner structure of man, the large will be his inadequation to the world around, and during the moments of existential crisis, the incongruent with himself. A greater value given to a static aspect – a tree, a color, a dilemma – will determine a flowing' shutting off, the accumulation of psychical 'materials' and especially a large amount of miscarried experiences that will turn to be a same number of 'noises' between an individual and his own soul' messages.

Here is the proper time for somebody Else to come with a better perception, being able to break the barrage and, such, permitting the revival of evolution. This Somebody Else is an authoritarian instance who guides the evolution to what it is proper for it. “*Werde was du bist!*” is already the best label for it.

“For an individual there is still the question whether he finds the way to what it was already destined to his essence, an essence that corresponds best to this destiny of being”<sup>4</sup>.

It is just this question to bring an observation: there is no room here for getting a concrete, punctual solution, as soon as the problem is only apparent concrete one. Here it is implied the whole individual's existence, so we have to take into account even those aspects that seem to be less important. The suggestion may come from a natural element or from a dream; from another person or from something we heard by accident. It may be a feeling, a conviction or a material object. On another hand, the way out has to contain some present or past-unfulfilled aspects but also attributes of the coming time. Therefore we may say that there is no need for some strict qualification as soon as existential sphere is much more comprising. We can say that any field of human competence is a narrow, fragmented specialisation in comparison to the crisis that characterises the whole. Thus, any science has a secondary, auxiliary position. But "being is neither this one, nor the other one" It is something else, of another order, another nature. Any science may answer to a certain aspect, without solving the problem. The crisis is on another level. When it becomes noticeable and stifles the individual, a real change of paradigm is needed, in spite of the risks and necessary costs.

"In any circumstances, the stage that can be properly called 'critic' is the one that leads immediately to a solution, either favourable or not, is a situation in which some kind of decision is to be taken".<sup>5</sup>

In the case of some existential crisis, the duty to propose another Way belongs to moral instances and not professional ones. Here starts the difference between *spiritual masters* and *professors*. The latest can be great personalities inside their competence domain, but the crisis is beyond this space. Defining the geometrical locus of the solution asks for individual's disposability to receive other kind of answers, to offer spiritually himself to a receiver or another. The election does not cross-predictable routs because it contains unknown elements in its intimate structure. As it follows, none is qualified, justified or indicated for this job. The 'mission' is not got trough rational means, but after a reciprocal enlightenment, having its spring on the inconscient strata.

"The one who manages trough a one second meeting to determine us pass the threshold, can play for us the part of a Master"<sup>6</sup>.

So, masters can be only 'des vivants experimentes qui transmettent á d'autre vivants' (A. M. Besnard). Both are passing trough a conscient self-evolution, a real evolution, search, as only the flow requires meeting

with the Other, his recognition, welcoming him in the depths of being's redefinition. As soon as a teacher can offer you long lists of theories, explanations, examples in a given domain, a spiritual master

“realises a incision in disciple's soul, marks him with the red iron of purity”<sup>7</sup>.

So, in the first case an “epidermical” issue of spiritual intimacy is solved, an intellectiv level, in the other case operation enters the Ego's motivational and defensive resorts. But this comes to offer himself to the meeting with the Other one because he notices the jump's proximity, the imminence of his salvation, of his getting out from a crisis, thus limited in the favour of becoming.

On the other side,

“the relations that do establish between them are complex and are not to be found on the simple level of transmitting and reception of a science and of a new lifestyle. They suppose a both sides undressing of the self and also a real availability to welcome the Other”<sup>8</sup>.

If it were a unilateral offer, it might end by one's being swallowed into the other's project or, even by a failure of the first one's life. However it might be the reduction of one subject to the part of a simple instrument for the other. But confession means a superior meeting of two instances placed in a dialogue position. Each one has to start perceiving the other as a light source in order to be opened for the meeting. Each one has to be in the case of needing something else in his existence. Here is no room for experiences, or for half measures. Any 'rational control' is but a prove of miss decision, that is a denial of the challenge, a hesitation not only in the front of the other, but of own condition. Therefore, giving up, approximation, split personality would annul the meeting, advertising the other about the danger of a farce and would stop the first individual in a vicious circle between he and himself.

“The true spirit is this very unity of what is absolute separated and it comes to existence as a medium term of them, just trough the *free reality* of these extremes that lack themselves”<sup>9</sup>.

Therefore, the offer's gratuitousness is not a proper one, but, on the contrary, a complete motivated confession aiming to place the individual in a natural flow. This kind of meeting does dislocate all the barriers it

encounters, sustaining the birth of two new persons. It is an initiation or even an ascetic process<sup>10</sup> during which

“all the existential categories of the disciple are set under doubt”<sup>11</sup>.

Our two subjects play alternately the part of a disciple. The other one, turned into a master starts to

“wake up a sense”<sup>12</sup>

as

“he offers a higher fulfilment possibility, gives us courage to become what we have to become”<sup>13</sup>

trough modifying the essential data of the paradigm. By this sculpture in being's possibilities, the meeting re-evaluates the already used valences, the relation efforts – successes in order to identify the Ego's eventual traps. A new hierarchy of alternatives is thus obtained and also a separation between soteriological roads from the ones that block the individual in repetitions and bavardaj. We don't have here

“a science closed in formulas but some kind of light”<sup>14</sup>.

Grace to the courage that he transmits, a master releases an inner purification of the disciple from different scruples, debts determining him to read all these from another altitude where he already arrives while trying to avoid failing. He will thus get a semantic grid trough which all that appeared to be homogenous divides in several levels of different importance, according to their belonging to essential, to accessory or even to the sphere of useless. Since the disciple was offered a new whole in which he intends to find himself as soon as possible, he will release alone from all what – in the new context – might seem counter-productive or even degrading.

Metaphorically speaking, these new premises, this new context free of old traps recovers something from the pure time of the beginning. It looks like a return to childhood times, when a fairy hand puts aside all the clouds in order to give a new chance to the game. Here lays the explanation of the total availability of the disciple: he gets back all the arguments to go on. Master

“takes over all his anguishes”<sup>15</sup>

gifting the disciple with self-control.

“The disciple has to invent, at the risk of his liberty, a new kind of spiritual existence”<sup>16</sup>.

Here is the meaning of gained liberty, of liberty meaning escape from blocks and return to real being of the disciple. It is, in fact, a self – rediscover in the very intimate of Ego’s real projects as well as a discovery of the road to their fulfilment. The main part of a master is not to keep an eye on the liberation, but to release it in such a way that it should later on continue the flow alone, under the master’s moral authority. Of course, in all those cases where the directly presence is possible, it will help the disciple to avoid new crisis, but, in the same time, even a hasty meeting can confess for a definitive change of one’s existential route. The efficiency and the quality of a jump lay, of course, in strict dependence to the need of a permanent duty that may also lead to a eventual liberation of the disciple from the possibility of entering a crisis (this is the case of great initiates). Inside the disciple, master’s authority as well as the exigencies implied by their meeting would determine the exercise of a spiritual inner master (A. M. Besnard) who takes over “the functions” of the other one, the exterior master and who protects the natural, progressive setting free of the disciple. The same master will look over the maintaining of the gained stage and even of the realising of a new meeting expected to protect the self - search or self-found.

It was raised the question upon the opportunity of a spiritual master and even upon the reality of his exercise. It was suspected to be only the effort of the inner master, al the rest being just an illusion. Is it possible for a man to teach another one or, each of us gets to knowledge just grace his Self who maintains the exigencies of search? In this case, initiates would be only those who know how to listen such a master, all the others remaining to a superficial stage, at the opinion level rather than to *episteme* one. Trying to draw a master’s portrait, Sf. Augustin realises some kind of semiotics *avant-la-lettre*. In his study entitled *De magistro* he notices that – as concerning gnoseology – we have to specify whether we refer to a thing or to the sign that sends, that stays for a thing. Following Plato, he suggests some kind of *anamnesis*, the thing would have been known *a priori*.

“All those that are signified trough words have been long ago in the field of our knowledge”<sup>17</sup>.

The words', the linguistic signs' role is raising to life the inner knowledge of a thing, inserting it in the sphere of the useful 'elements' of our existence.

"Through the words, we do not learn anything but words, or even less, only the sign and the noise of a word"<sup>18</sup>.

So any exterior instance can't "teach" us but the forms of things, while the essences belong to our interior's competence. While in our existential experience we do not need forms, but solutions, the conclusion would be that no individual could offer us the way out of blocking. The individual close of us can, at the most, ask

"questions suited to the inner way of learning of the one asked ... so as his own powers to prepare themselves to listen that inner master."<sup>19</sup>

We do believe that this "preparation" is not unimportant as soon as – especially today – man became so much a slave of his debts, frustrations and fears that without the exercise of an exterior instance, he would be incapable to hear his inner master. The presence of this master seems to be only a necessary condition, not a sufficient one, too. It is needed a surplus of life, of decision, of courage to risk everything for a new self-definition. This surplus can't be gained but from outside. Here is to be found the difference between men and saints, as the latest manage to free themselves from this dependence. In the same time, common people need to get from outside what they do not have inside: the power to go on.

"The one who searches for the Way does never find it alone, but through an original relationship with one or more people who have power grace to this relation and, of course, grace to what they themselves had became, grace to a truth that had been condensed in themselves. It is a power to free the one they have already met, making him discover <the right way or the good sight>. (S. Jean de la Croix)"<sup>20</sup>.

We believe that the real *anamnesis* takes place at this level of finding the Self, not only of the common things. Meeting a spiritual master is the one that determines the notice of a crisis, of the incongruence between what you Are and what you simply are, between your real face and your daily image. In the context of this comfortless, due to the difference you "remember", you learn again the reality of your being that determines

you to try to remake the identity with yourself. While learning, understanding your common places belongs to the act of learning some sciences, so belongs to teaching, beyond it, one needs to obtain the whole expected to redefine the very need of sciences or, their overpass. Here we meet Thomas d'Aquino's thoughts who, starting his research from the whole, considers master's part to be ineluctable. More precisely, he notices that, although things' knowledge is in the soul, it is a *universal* one. We might add that man is not capable to understand the universal meanings, needing something concrete, too. Therefore, we follow Thomas d'Aquino who pointed out:

“it is said that someone gets knowledge when, starting from these universal notions, his spirit is lead to actually know particular things that have been known before only under their universal, and somehow potential aspect”<sup>21</sup>.

As a consequence, true efficient consciences can be obtained only with a “master's” help, who (even if)

“he doesn't say you anything that you haven't already known with your heart, but, trough your meeting with him, a light crosses your spirit. You think you really apply all those things”<sup>22</sup>.

Trough Fall, man entered an immediate relation to the concrete that alone, offers justifies or solutions. Even if a whole philosophico–theological tradition would sustain the pre-eminence of transcendental values, common people need their embodiment in material elements: a living master to be met at a physical level and to give him power. It is some kind of reversed epics: in order for the changes to take place at spiritual's level, concrete meetings are needed. In the fight between gods – that is: ideas, feelings, Ways – the determinant part is played by empirical contacts and gestures, so as, while starting from there, due to recovered power, man to be able come back to himself, to the destiny of the being in himself.

While a fallen individual needs a spiritual master, meeting this one can recover the fall, offering him to another ontological level. This is the meaning of a well-known story

“that says that receiving Torah was such a strong emotional shock for the Jews, that they had given their souls, they died. In order to bring them back to life, God send a dense dew that recovered them”<sup>23</sup>.

Who is the one who searches? Who can be a disciple? We can't suppose to be our intellect, as it is responsible with the concrete, with *episteme*. Feelings have less chance for this nominalisation, being polarized and mobile. Much more, they use to block ascension, getting linked to each step emphasizing more its good parts than the idea of something to be overpassed. So, the whole effort has to be the duty of *that something that is deeper inside us than we are*.

"The interior man signifies a man considered in his most profound interiority, where he is spirited by the Holy Spirit, where Jesus lives through faith, where is procreated love that comes from Jesus. ... Inside the interior man can be found the secret links to God' saving plan, here faith and life through Spirit do act, as well as regeneration"<sup>24</sup>.

As the two subjects of dialogue are instances who differ both structural and ontological, there will be necessary a common language turning them into open monads. Otherwise, we would all remain in Plato's cave. Man knows being's language as he is created by the being. If it wouldn't be so, is non-being would have been the spring of our lives, we would either have empowered a negative ontology or justified a lot of contradictions. But man is being' son and

"language is being' shelter. In its shelter does the man live"<sup>25</sup>.

As a consequence, Being is in each of us. It is the Holy Spirit grace to whom we communicate to God. It is the "spiritual staircase" that we have to climb in order to get out from the consequences of failure into body. And

"it is expected to be fulfilled only what it were from the beginning. But what it were before anything else, is the being"<sup>26</sup>.

It is a part that stands for the whole and sends to it. This is where the imperative: "Search for yourself!" came from. This part is in the same time, essence, Way and goal. No exterior guide can find out what Part is in each of us, so, which the real Way is. He will suppose, will try to find out. A success can't have the key but there where the break, the fall is. There where *The Same* had been divided into a runaway son, who left to test all world's paths and a brother who remained to take care. He, the brother

“is looking through the keyhole. ... He would have left worldwide if he met a master”<sup>27</sup>.

But the other did. As a consequence, being inside us, the inner man who waits and preserves can't act anyhow. He needs a broken up, the separate definition of the two instances in order to become efficient after noticing the need of intervention.

“All the myths are, perhaps, connected to the myth of fall. Because if man wouldn't have been a fallen being, he hadn't needed myths”<sup>28</sup>.

But a myth speaks to each one as much as he's able to understand. Like Narcissus' water, she, the water knows a lot of fairy things. But man himself is the one who, having a crisis, has to discover anamnetical which of water's stories is addressed to him. Here is the test. King's daughter is the key. But all seem to be the same. Being identical, the appearances can't speak to anyone. Being's search has to be the fulfillment of an interiority who, alone, can respond for the placement and distribution of being into things.

“This is why there's no need for lessons. You do not have to teach even a man who asks you. ... States of spirit, this is to be given to others; no contents, no advice, no lessons”<sup>29</sup>.

Like water does, the oracle that runaway son looks for, has to offer him the whole. Serenity state, a symbol of fulfillment would be sufficient for the son to find in himself the proper questions and, as a consequence, the way back.

“You always become the thing to which you mostly look” (Phileas).

Heidegger would have said that is a sight problem. A correct look to a right goal is the one that changes you. The inner man defines his existential route in dependence to his sight.

“You have to live with the great self-pride and looking to the sky, to say loudly close to whom or like who you want to become”<sup>30</sup>.

Noica does not say: “look at me”, but to a plenitude. To a face of the whole, as soon as, being just a man, he could never lead from inside. He can create the context. Can lead the sight. But the sight belongs to the inner emptiness that meets / that has to meet the Whole. Between the

prescriptions that came from inside and the road's interdictions, the runaway son will bring home the ariadnic fire of save. And this son is inside of us, of each of us, "deeper than we ourselves".

"It should be observed that is useless to speak about light as soon as nobody can see it; much more, it would be necessary to teach people the art of seeing"<sup>31</sup>.

But art is much more than a science, even is, at an empirical level, the latest seem to offer a more coherent corpus of information. The one who has to see has no need of information. He is just denying the world around in order to get his own one, and thus, to obtain himself. In this respect, there is no science to offer him anything. Art is a whole that, if it is correctly received, generates, helps the birth of another whole.

"Art asks for the whole Being"<sup>32</sup>

because it is itself a whole. Art can only be met in a full, rounded Cosmos, where each element lies in interdependence with the others. Therefore, it can't address only to one part of the individual, because each element asks a certain kind of sight that depends from other ones and from interrogations as well. Much more, individual as a whole can't even exist but by getting "food" from all the compartments of his life. Why is it so?

"Sun is God's image (and) heart is sun's image in man"<sup>33</sup>.

So, heart as an image of the Whole's image has to be the "instrument" with the closest structure to that of the Whole, namely heart has to be the image Narcis was searching for. While he receives, trough heart the whole's valences, man can dream to a feeding of each compartment of his life, especially of those he does not know.

"It is obvious that many people are not able to understand the link between divine images and their own soul; so they can't see in what respect those images are to be found in their own inconscient. In order to make this inner sight possible, the way to sightseeing *has to be made free*."<sup>34</sup>

Here is to be identifies a spiritual master's exercise, as a liberator, but also the exigencies he faces. In order to understand other one's way, in order to be able to "see" in other' soul, master himself needs an

extraordinary “sight”, namely a capacity to notice the sun from himself to harmonise the proper valences and become clear as a spring.

“Master’s transparency turns him into a God’s icon”<sup>35</sup>.

But man is an image of an image; a third level reality. Each master is, at least, a mixture between light and shadows. In his best case, he is *one God’s icon*, but the icon itself is only partly “efficient”. Any might be our perspective, the icon is a material symbol, an exterior one that can be interiorised only *once with / after the true interiorisation of the one for which it stays: the Absolute*. The one who searches wants, in fact, to life the Absolute, not only to objectivate it. Phenomenology did prove it enough. While living the Absolute asks for something else, too, for that *Ganz Andere*, that is the immediate presence of sacred, of the Whole.

“Only the power of a free person will be able to liberate”<sup>36</sup>.

And real free is only God. All the others, people, any would be the spiritual level to which they belong, depend more or less to their body as a material entity. Earth and water gave birth to life, but freedom belongs to water that dominates the earth, the fragments of earth it is carrying with.

Therefore, the only way for an individual is to search inside him what in the material world around is not to be found. He will get either a God’s icon, or the eye read to “see” beyond materials (even beyond the material he is, too or, beyond all possible materials). This fact

“implies the necessity of getting down in the obscure world of unconscious, the ritual act of getting down in the cave, the adventure of a night trip on the sea”<sup>37</sup>.

It is a return to the Self and a search in some place where it was interdicted so far. All the exterior solutions are not painful, as they do not require being’s implication. There are different kinds of solutions around and the individual usually adopts them *just because they do not painful affect* the profound strata of his soul. They prove a psychical comfort but just for this reason, they belong to a superficial level, offering no solution to the crisis. They are crisis’ consequences, evidences of an incomplete assuming of the road. They are small, narrow paths, various aspects of the crisis. They function in an inflationistic manner as they haven’t pass through a purification process, yet. On the contrary, the searched solution is a ritual bath, but it also supposes the separation from something that was organically linked to the previous evolution of that individual. You

need to lose something, to have something dead inside you, in order to see *free* and better. Namely, to look around without the crisis stigmata of your sight. Any crisis has, of course, a reason, meaning an intimate debt of the individual. This stops the eyes to see properly, and thus, it has to be extirpated in spite of the suffer it may cause.

“One can't enter the truth before passing through his own death, without having tarried in a state of extreme and total humiliation”<sup>38</sup>.

This death is equivalent not only to crisis, but also to the facts that had generated the crisis or helped it. And also to all those aspects of life that have been touched, influenced and deteriorated through cohabitation with the crisis in one's own person. Any other attempt to get health might have preserved at least one piece of crisis, being able to lead at any time, to a crisis restoration. An annul is needed, the entrance in a symbolic chaos perceived as a psychical one that might require a world's remake, according to your new inner profile.

“The fear and the restraint that any natural human being feels face to a profound immersion in himself are nothing else than the anguishes face to a trip to hell”<sup>39</sup>.

He will have to see the stumbles and the limits that he himself did create while accepting them on his own road; he will have to see again all those aspects he wanted to forget, to cross again roads he left aside because he could not continue any longer. It is a meeting with himself, a *stumble of logos into physis*<sup>40</sup>, a denial of those aspects he credited as valuable, even benefic. It is a separation from all that defined you so far in order to obtain another inner face, some other valances, other powers – that are waiting for you in a state of moral purity.

C. G. Jung reminds us from some narratives of different kinds and origins, narratives that continue this *descensus ad inferos* through a hot weather, a room, an “incubator” that realizes chemical, better said alchemical, the disintegration of the one who dies in order to sublimate its projects, getting him back to his road, saving him, turning him to life. In the middle of that hotness, the heart will get to solar temperature, becoming again its image, light's reflection inside the individual and thus, will be spiritualized again a fallen material. Due to the fire that burns the psychical material that is responsible for crisis start, ‘leading’ a disciple becomes alchemy of his own being.

“At the door of the fireplace” will appear a *homunculus* already prepared for a new life, for a new climbing. Being the embodiment of a

pure spirit, he will not preserve anything from the one who died. Runaway son did lost even his lost finding himself and thus, saving the meaning of the road he has to pass. The solution lied in himself, trough a better formula of his inner structure. All the people around, being exteriors could have advised him, could have given him books maps receipts. He needed but an inner fire, an entrance in an inner furnace in order to re/harmonize his road's lessons with the disponibilities of his being.

We may conclude that the real, the only real master is an inner one, who sets the fire and guides all this alchemic process of death and rebirth.

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- <sup>2</sup> "However, water comes out from earth, and soul from water" – said Clemes, cf. *Filosofia greaca pina la Platon*, vol.1, partea a 2 a, Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, Bucuresti, 1979, page 355.
- <sup>3</sup> *Genesis*, 2, 6.
- <sup>4</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Scrisoare despre umanism", in *Repere pe drumul gândirii*, Editura Politică, București, 1988, page 312.
- <sup>5</sup> Rene Guenon, *Criza lumii moderne*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1993, page 26.
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- <sup>10</sup> Cf. A. M. Besnard, *Op.cit.*, page 17.
- <sup>11</sup> F. Schuon, *Op. cit.*, page 283.
- <sup>12</sup> M. Meslin, *Op. cit.*, page 13.
- <sup>13</sup> A. M. Besnard, *Idem*.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>15</sup> M. Meslin, *Op. cit.*, page 17.
- <sup>16</sup> Claude Geffré, «Conclusion», in M. Meslin, *Op.cit.*, page 224.
- <sup>17</sup> Augustin, *De magistro*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1994, page 111.
- <sup>18</sup> Augustin, *Op. cit.*, page 109.
- <sup>19</sup> *Idem*, page 117.
- <sup>20</sup> A. M. Besnard, *Op. cit.*, page 12.
- <sup>21</sup> Thoma d'Aquino, *Op. cit.*, page 51.
- <sup>22</sup> A. M. Besnard, *Op. cit.*, page 18.
- <sup>23</sup> Patricia Hidiroglou, *Apa divină*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 1997, page 60.
- <sup>24</sup> *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, Beauchesne, Paris, tome III, *Homme interieur*, col. 652–653.
- <sup>25</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Op. cit.*, page 297.
- <sup>26</sup> *Idem*, page 297.
- <sup>27</sup> Constantin Noica, *Jurnal filosofic*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1990, page 101 și 98.
- <sup>28</sup> *Idem*, page 25.
- <sup>29</sup> *Idem*, page 9.

<sup>30</sup> Constantin Noica, în *Jurnalul de la Păltiniș*, Gabriel Liiceanu, Editura Humanitas, București, 1991, page 73.

<sup>31</sup> Carl Gustav Jung, *Psihologie și alchimie*, Editura Teora, București, 1996, vol. 1, page 17.

<sup>32</sup> *Idem*, page 12.

<sup>33</sup> C. G. Jung, *Op. cit.*, vol. 2, page 104.

<sup>34</sup> C. G. Jung, *Op. cit.*, vol.1, pag. 17.

<sup>35</sup> M. Meslin, *Op. cit.*, page 9.

<sup>36</sup> Gabriel Albu, *Introducere într-o pedagogie a libertății*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 1998, page 43.

<sup>37</sup> C. G. Jung, *Op. cit.*, vol. 2, page 91.

<sup>38</sup> S. Weil, *Écrits de Londres*, Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1957, page 34 in Françoise Bonardel, *Filosofia alchimiei. Marea Operă și modernitatea*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2000, page 169.

<sup>39</sup> C. G. Jung, *Op. cit.*, vol. 2, page 98.

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PHILOSOPHIC DISCOURSE AND METAPHOR

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The double presence of the metaphor within the philosophic discourse - on the one hand, as a discursive "strategy" and, on the other hand, as "subject" of philosophical thinking – is no longer bewildering to anyone today. That is justified especially by the importance the problems of the metaphor have gained within the contemporary philosophical thinking. For several decades we have witnessed a real "mutation" of the problems of the metaphor from the level of purely stylistic, linguistic and psychological conditionings to that of philosophical substantiation. How could one explain this persistent curiosity about a topic when

"it might appear as if everything had been said about it"<sup>1</sup>,

as Umberto Eco noticed. The metaphor seems to be an already old issue, but is it a "worn-out" one, a one to have reached the

"evening of its life"?<sup>2</sup>

Due to the finding that the metaphor benefits by a still uncertain status within philosophy, the answer can be but a negative one.

This work does not intend to justify the presence of metaphor within the philosophic discourse, but rather to plead for the "recovery" of it within the above mentioned frames. Why a "recovery"? Because it looks like we witness a paradox of metaphor: the rush of the metaphorological

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<sup>1</sup> Eco, Umberto, *Semiotique et philosophie de langage*, PUF, Paris, 1988, p. 140.

<sup>2</sup> Derrida, Jacques, «Le retrait de la metaphore», in *Psyche. Invention de l'autre*, Galilee, Paris, 1987, p. 66.

research has been accompanied lately by a reverse movement, a “retraction” of the metaphor from the philosophical speech. The attempts “to retry” it from the philosophical discourse are based on two objections against the metaphor: the first one refers to the discontinuity between metaphor and concept, while the second aims at the very possibility of a non-circular philosophical discourse on metaphor.

The two major arguments will be presented below: one in favor of the retry of the metaphor from the philosophic speech, with the attempt to concurrently underline a possible counterargument for it.

### **The Discontinuity Between Concept and Metaphor**

One of the oldest objections voiced against metaphor is that according to which the metaphor is a common figure of speech, its role being reduced to an imaginative presentation of a term or fact.

According to structuralism-based neo-rhetoricians<sup>3</sup>, this objection occurs along with the restriction of rhetoric to tropologic research, which aimed at a purely technical taxonomy of the figures of speech. Metaphor is a trope made up of one word, with non-literal or figurative meaning. According to the theory of substitution, the word used with its literal sense comes to be “substituted” to an absent term in order to fill a semantic gap so that the piece of information offered by the metaphor is null and void, while the absent draft can be regained when it exists. If the information is void, then the metaphor works with a purely “decorative” function and it is meant

“to be likeable, adorning the language, coloring the discourse, clothing the nude expression of the thought”<sup>4</sup>.

This “restricted” outlook on metaphor concluded with the claim of a discontinuity between metaphor-regarded as lacking the cognitive value- and concept-as means of cognition of which the results of abstracting process are comprised.

How could we, on such conditions, recover the metaphor within the philosophic discourse? Is such a recovery possible? It is at the very “initial” moment of the metaphor, i.e. in the Aristotelian theory on

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<sup>3</sup> Genette, Girard, *La rhétorique restreinte*, in *Communications* 16, Seuil, 1970, pp.158-171.

<sup>4</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, *Metafora vie*, Editura Univers, Bucuresti, 1984, p. 83.

metaphor where one can find the answer. The greatly sagacious strategy initiated by Aristotle consists exactly of the demand of assigning cognitive value to the metaphor, of submitting it to conceptual thinking. This approach would have not reached its goals if Aristotle had not initiated another method: that of regaining rhetoric in the limits of the philosophical discourse, or, to put it in other words, that of converting it into philosophic subject. That strategy equated the consolidation of the persuasive techniques, starting from the theory of the syllogism.

“Rhetoric helps... to the discovery of genuine or of apparent persuasiveness (*to pithanon*), as well as dialectics does with real and with seeming syllogism”<sup>5</sup>.

Thus, Aristotle deserves the prize for having developed the bond between the rhetorical concept of persuasion and the logical notion of verisimilitude or, perhaps, for having provided the bases of a philosophical rhetoric.

In Aristotle’s theory, the metaphor represents the “common” place, or (using P. Ricoeur’s expression) “the common nucleus” of two topics, differentiated by their nature and object: rhetoric and poetics. While rhetoric regards persuasiveness (*to pithanon*), the technique of persuasion in the oral discourse, poetics ponders on the tragic poesies whose finality is Catharsis. Whether it was edited subsequently, or just reviewed after having originated “Poetics”, “Rhetoric” simply takes over the definition of the metaphor presented in “Poetics”:

“Metaphor (*metaphora*) represents the transfer (*epiphora*) over an article of a name (*onomatos*) which designates another article (*allorion*), a transfer that can be either from gender to species (*apo tou genouos epi eidos*), from species to gender (*to eidous epi to genos apo*), from species to species (*apo tou eidous epi eidos*), or according to the reference to analogy (*e kata to analogon*)”<sup>6</sup>.

It is the term “epiphora” that draws the attention (it is known that *phora* is the Greek for “changing place”). “Epiphora” has a double meaning: first, the negative purport of “transfer” (or “transposition”) as “diversion” or “deviation” from the current and common use of a name (*kurion*), and, secondly, the positive meaning of “transfer” as “loaning”

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetorique III*, Les belles Lettres, Paris, 1973, (1355b 15).

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *Poetique*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1969 (1457b 6-9).

(*allotrios*) of a word that on a regular basis has a different signification. This “transfer” is related to the report of analogy.

To Aristotle thus,

“to create a good metaphor” (*eu metapherein*)

represents

“to thoroughly perceive the similarities” (*to to hoion theoreinmo*)<sup>7</sup>.

The appeal to metaphor implies the “disclosure” of a resemblance that lies in *physis* (taken as grounds, as a resource of innovation and revelation). The metaphor fulfils a heuristic function; since it exposes likeness, it is also a semantic innovation.

At the same time, the Aristotelian metaphor seems to suggest the idea of a category transgression, understood as a meaning provider, but also as a deviation when related to the already established logical order. Indeed, the metaphor occurs in an order previously constituted in genders and species and as a netting of particular relations: subordination, coordination, proportionality. Moreover, as P. Ricoeur noticed:

”rendering the name of the species to the gender, the title of the second to the fourth term of the proportional report and vice versa implies admitting and transgressing the logical structure of the speech”<sup>8</sup>.

It is obvious now what the particularity of the Aristotelian theory on metaphor consists in. Since it is a “spontaneous” intimation of similarity, the metaphor carries a new piece of information, and it consequently possesses cognitive value. If related to the concept, which is a “determination” of meaning, the metaphor can be appreciated as an “indication” of meaning.

“Metaphor, the result of *mimesis* and *homoiosis*, embodiment of analogy, will thus be a means of cognition”<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, 1459a 4-8.

<sup>8</sup> Ricoeur, P., *Op.cit.*, p. 41.

<sup>9</sup> Derrida, Jacques, *La mythologie blanche*, in *Marges de la Philosophie*, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1997, p. 283.

Therefore, we are not dealing with an irreconcilable opposition between metaphor and concept, but with a continuity between the two of them: metaphor precedes and represents a step towards conceptualization. Thus, metaphor is inserted within the order of cognition, although its status is an intermediary one.

### **The Impossibility of a Non-Circular Philosophic Discourse on Metaphor**

The second major objection against metaphor highlights the very possibility of a non-circular philosophical speech on metaphor. Indeed, a generic suspicion seems to have always accompanied any attempt to theorize metaphor within the frames of philosophy. Here is how J. Derrida states that objection:

“Whenever rhetoric defines the metaphor, it involves not only a philosophy, but also a conceptual network out of where philosophy emerged. Each strip of the network additionally forms a turn-over; one might even call it a metaphor if that notion were not too derived. The one-to-be-defined is included into the definiens of the definition”<sup>10</sup>.

Derrida considers this recurrence to be distinctively striking with Aristotle. The definition he gives to this metaphor is itself a metaphorical enunciation, for its parts already carry a transfer, a displacement of meaning. Therefore,

“*metaphora* or *epiphora* also nominate a movement of spatial translation, *eidōs* means visible image, outline or form (...) too; *genos* signifies the source of a birth, of an origin, of a family as well etc.”<sup>11</sup>.

The consequences are double and contradictory to the philosophic discourse: on the one hand we cannot establish and operate with the concept of metaphor that does not function as “a philosophical output” in the same time; on the other hand, philosophy cannot demand a conceptualization of the metaphor as long as the notions used within the philosophical speech have been themselves derived from a meaning

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 274.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 301-302.

displacement (such as the terms of “sense” and “sensible”, “idea” and “theory”, “ground” and “concept” etc.). In this way it is questioned the very statute of the theoretical speech, the justification of the initial meaning displacement that the basic terms of the language support.

As P. Ricoeur stated, there is

“a paradox of self-acting for the metaphor”: a speech on metaphor is not possible without the use of a conceptual netting that itself has been figuratively generated.

Derrida’s analysis aims especially at the metaphysical discourse that has to justify to itself its own language that seems “originated” into a net of metaphors: the metaphor of “sun”, of “moon”, of “basement”, of “soil” etc.

At the same time, a dangerous lack of distinction between metaphorical and metaphysical takes shape, forasmuch any metaphorical enunciation does nothing but to reiterate an utterance of the “opposition” (of the sensible-comprehensible, proper-improper, revealing-concealing type) that configures itself the structure of the metaphysical speech.

From this perspective, as P. Ricoeur underlines, Derrida’s analysis appears to be just

“a generalization of the restricted Heideggerean critic”<sup>12</sup>.

Indeed, Heidegger himself stated that:

“metaphor is metaphorically told”,  
“the metaphoric attribute exists only within metaphysics”,

to put it in other words, the transgression of the metaphor and of the metaphysics signifies one and the same transfer, i.e. that of the literal sense into the figurative one, of the sensible into the non-sensible.

What would be the consequences of such an analysis? Up to certain limits, we are dealing with an abysmal decay of metaphysics; Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphor finally leads to the deconstruction of the metaphysical speech through aporia. Yet, is such a deconstruction justified?

The analysis J. Derrida presented, implies at least two objections. Firstly, his demarche could be reduced to an etymologist point of view

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<sup>12</sup> Ricoeur, P., *Op. cit.*, p. 326.

that crumbles over its own bases in search for a proper meaning as an “original”, “primal” significance. Derrida’s objection could be accepted just as much as the analysis of a theory on metaphor i.e. the Aristotelian one, highlights the fact that the terms standing for the fundamental ideas of philosophy cannot represent a conventional, neutral and arbitrary selection within the frames of this doctrine.

Furthermore, as P. Ricoeur affirms, it would be enough to apply to the concept of metaphor certain observations on the shaping of the idea within its scheme, using a pattern not fundamentally distinctive from Kant’s own view.

“To speak metaphorically about metaphor does not mean to speak circularly, for the position of the concept dialectically emerges right from the metaphor”<sup>13</sup>.

Considering all this, when Aristotle defines the metaphor by “the epiphora” of the word, the term “epiphora” is conceptually classified through its inclusion within a system of inter-significances, being framed by major ideas, such as: physis, logos, onoma, semainen etc. “Epiphora” eludes its metaphorical attributes, becoming lexically loaned, setting up its own literal sense.

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 454.

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## MODÈLES DE LA COMMUNICATION

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La communication est devenue l'objet de recherche de plusieurs disciplines réunies sous une dénomination commune: les sciences de la communication. La communication humaine est la relation qui implique, à côté du contenu informationnel transmis, des émotions, des attitudes, des intérêts et des interactions des sujets qui y participent. La communication est celle qui crée la communion et la communauté, c'est-à-dire une configuration de relations plutôt qu'une quantité d'informations. Ce point de vue est spécifique plutôt au sociologue qu'à l'informaticien, car il relève le sens de la communication humaine, ne concevant pas la communication en l'absence d'un sujet qui conscientise ou non l'information expédiée ou réceptionnée. De cette perspective, on peut accepter la définition qui dit que

«La communication humaine est un processus par lequel un individu (le communicateur) transmet des stimuli (d'habitude verbaux) dans le but de changer le comportement d'autres individus (l'auditoire)» (Dinu, M., 1999, p. 9).

C. Noica souligne que le mot latin

«*communicatio, onis* a non seulement la signification de contact et de liaison, mais aussi de «mettre en commun, partager, mettre ensemble, mélanger et unifier» (Noica, C., 1970, p. 17).

Pendant une communication on transmet non seulement des informations, des messages, mais aussi des symboles, des signes, des significations; autrement dit, on transmet et on réceptionne «des sens», de la connaissance. Dans le processus de la communication seulement

les informations comprises donnent du sens existentiel. Pour cette raison, toute sorte de communication présuppose un engagement qui, en fait, est une relation qui implique un comportement. Le transfert informationnel devient communication lorsque l'information du message est comprise et qu'une action appropriée est entreprise. Cela suppose une connaissance nécessaire à la compréhension du message.

La communication vise la provocation d'une prédisposition pour l'action; les déterminations de l'action trouvent dans la communication le support cognitif, motivationnel et volitif, momentané, transitoire ou d'une autre nature subjective. Pour devenir action, le message est au début incitation qui devient connaissance par l'intermédiaire de la compréhension. C. Noica précise que l'homme pense et «réfléchit» (se plonge dans sa pensée), sélectionne les informations nouvelles, les vérifie, les analyse de la perspective des informations devenues déjà des normes et des valeurs et puis il actionne. La structure des connaissances et leur volume ont le support dans l'expérience pratique et théorique antérieures, dans le système de normes et de valeurs auxquelles il se rapporte tout au long de la communication. Le processus de compréhension se déroule parallèlement à l'acte de communication, puisque le locuteur va diriger une partie de son attention pour contrôler la compréhension de l'interlocuteur (pour voir qu'est-ce qu'il a compris). Tout au long de la communication, le locuteur a besoin de la confirmation de l'interlocuteur, car il est intéressé d'atteindre, par son discours, un certain but.

La communication peut être considérée comme un processus dans le cadre duquel le locuteur est engagé dans une forme particulière: il pose des questions auxquelles il désire, biensûr, des réponses, il fait des promissions ou de diverses affirmations que — évidemment, supposons-nous —, il va honorer ou démontrer. Par conséquent, le locuteur doit formuler une ou plusieurs propositions cohérentes, avec une structure logique, qui possèdent une fonction communicative. Mais le locuteur cherche non seulement à se faire compris, mais aussi à recevoir des réponses adéquates, c'est-à-dire à établir un dialogue avec l'interlocuteur. Cela signifie qu'il désire d'être accepté par son interlocuteur, et que le discours devienne interactif. Dans cette phase, à côté du fait qu'il émet des informations, il reçoit d'autres informations de la part de son interlocuteur. La communicativité (qui implique la compréhension) et l'interactivité (qui suppose la recherche de la compréhension) représentent deux dimensions essentielles de la communication. Par conséquent, la communication, comme contenu, est une synthèse composée d'information et de la compréhension trouvée en corrélation par l'intermédiaire de la connaissance (commune,

scientifique, philosophique, artistique etc.) qui se déroule contextuellement par intérêt. Les protagonistes impliqués dans l'acte communicationnel (le locuteur et l'interlocuteur) doivent connaître les mêmes signes et symboles, ils doivent avoir un système commun de valeurs et même, dans certaines situations, ils doivent avoir des idéals semblables.

Compte tenu du fait que le mot «communication» désigne un ensemble trop vaste de pratiques (disparates, nombreuses et infiniment ouvertes), la réflexion sur les phénomènes de communication attire une série d'interférences avec d'autres disciplines. Par conséquent, la relative autonomie revendiquée par le domaine interdisciplinaire des sciences de l'information et de la communication correspond plutôt à certaines exigences d'ordre pratique et théorique. L'individualisation du domaine est engendrée, selon D. Bounoux, par

"la réflexion de la perspective anthropologique sur la redéfinition de la culture, étant identifiée aux diverses modalités de communiquer et centrée au début, dans les années '60, sur les changements et les formalisations linguistiques (par les recherches <<structura-listes>> de Lévi-Strauss, Barthes ou Jakobson)" (Bounoux, D., 2000, p. 13).

Sur l'objet d'étude de cette nouvelle discipline, Bounoux écrit:

«dans sa manière, la 'communication' vient comme un prolongement de la philosophie, relançant les grandes questions sur la vérité, le réel, les liaisons sociales, l'imaginaire, la possibilité d'apprendre, la justice, le consensus, le beau etc., en employant des concepts renouvelés (concepts passés surtout par la sémiologie et la pragmatique). D'une perspective moins idéaliste que celle philosophique, les sciences de l'information et de la communication examinent les conditions pratiques (l'ensemble d'instruments médiatiques, traditionnels et symboliques) qui nous sont propres. Elles favorisent donc le retour du sujet ou, pour mieux dire, de tous les sujets, y compris les objets et les instruments» (Bounoux, D., 2000, p. 14).

Saisissant la grande diversité des modalités de définir tant le terme de «communication» que celui de «science», Ch. R. Berger et S. H. Chaffee proposent une définition générale pour pouvoir couvrir les diverses coordonnées communicationnelles, y compris la production, la processation ou les effets des systèmes de symboles ou de signaux (verbaux et non-verbaux) dans un contexte interpersonnel,

organisationnel, politique, éducationnel ou dans le contexte de la communication en masse. Ainsi,

«la science de la communication cherche à comprendre la production, la processation et les effets des systèmes de symboles et de signaux, elle développe des théories testables et contient des généralisations nomologiques, qui expliquent les phénomènes associés à la production, à la processation et aux effets» (Berger, Ch. R., Chaffee, S. H., 1987, p. 17).

Mais ces auteurs attirent l'attention que la définition n'est pas exhaustive, elle ne couvre pas les préoccupations de ceux qui veulent, par exemple, émettre des jugements d'ordre éthique sur le comportement communicatif de certaines personnes ou institutions, ni les préoccupations de ceux qui visent le changement des politiques publiques concernant la communication institutionnelle. Puisque la réflexion sur la communication révendique l'attribut de la scientificité, elle doit fournir des explications par le développement de certains principes généraux qui peuvent être utilisés dans l'analyse des événements spécifiques ou de certaines classes d'événements.

L'analyse des paradigmes sur lesquels se fonde l'étude de la communication conduit B. Miège vers la conclusion qu'on peut parler d'une nouvelle «pensée», qu'il nomme «pensée communicationnelle», analogue aux autres «pensées» scientifiques, comme celles sociologiques, mathématiques ou historiques. La réunion de tout l'ensemble des recherches et des réflexions sur les phénomènes de la communication sous le générique de «pensée communicationnelle» est justifiée, selon Miège, par le fait que

«les sciences de l'information et de la communication offrent sur elles-mêmes sinon une image composite, du moins l'une complexe et diversifiée: les paradigmes ayant l'ambition de représenter toutes les dimensions, ils se déroulent ici avec régularité, et les oppositions théoriques, clairement affirmées, cachent des rapports réels et des propositions fécondes» (Miège, B., 1998, p. 11-12).

Les fondements épistémologiques des sciences de l'information et de la communication peuvent être clairement identifiés puisque

«dès les premiers pas, elle s'est construit sans cesse, parfois en exagérant, des bases théoriques exigeantes: soit se présentant comme une science des sciences (tentation récurrente), soit en essayant de se distinguer plus par son objet que par les méthodologies auxquelles on faisait recours, appartenant à

d'autres sciences humaines et sociales, reconnues avant elle et bénéficiant d'une plus grande légitimité» (Miège, B., 1998, p. 13).

Communiquer signifie mettre en commun des idées, des attitudes, des informations; communiquer ne signifie rien d'autre chose que coopérer. Pour communiquer on a donc besoin de deux partenaires, chacun s'adressant à l'autre, en lui fournissant des informations. De la perspective de l'argumentation, les sujets qui communiquent sont caractérisés par l'intérêt de modifier l'horizon cognitif commun. L'étude de la communication doit être abordée sous deux aspects: sa fonction et son fonctionnement. Sa fonction consiste dans la transmission de l'information et dans la diminution du niveau d'incertitude de celui auquel on s'adresse. Le modèle standard de la transmission de l'information élaboré par Shannon et Weaver (1949) suppose l'existence de trois éléments: émetteur, message, récepteur. Ultérieurement, à ce schéma classique on a ajouté d'autres éléments. La communication est un processus qui, de la perspective de la science de la communication, dispose de quatre composantes fondamentales (émetteur, canal, information, récepteur), qui configurent le modèle élémentaire de la communication. Puisque dans toute communication il y a une intention de l'émetteur en vue de provoquer un effet sur le récepteur, la communication devient un processus par lequel un émetteur transmet de l'information au récepteur par l'intermédiaire d'un canal, en vue de produire sur le récepteur certains effets (Guilenburg, J. J., van Scholten, O., Noomen, G. W., 2000, p. 25, 27).

J. B. Grize propose un modèle qui a encore trois éléments essentiels: la codification, le bruit et la décodification, dont parle aussi Guilenburg, lorsqu'il présente «le modèle fondamental de la communication» (Grize, J.B., 1996, p. 58). Dans le processus de communication interpersonnelle et interactive, ces éléments sont connectés d'une manière qui suggère la dynamique du processus de communication et les trajectoires des messages qui circulent entre les partenaires. En principe, les éléments de cet modèle sont: l'émetteur-le récepteur, la codification-la décodification, le message, le canal de communication, le bruit, les effets et la réponse.

Toutes les fois que les hommes communiquent directement et interactivement, ils se trouvent simultanément dans l'ipostase d'émetteur et de destinataire (récepteur) des messages. La double ipostase — d'émetteur et en même temps de récepteur — d'une personne située dans un contexte de communication interpersonnelle nous détermine de parler d'émetteur-récepteur, en employant tous les deux termes. Dans la communication interactive, la réception de certains messages a lieu dans le même temps qu'on émet les autres. De plus, chacun des

interlocuteurs réceptionne aussi ses propres messages, c'est-à-dire il est conscient de ses mouvements et de ses gestes, de ce qu'il dit, etc. De même, pendant qu'il parle, chaque interlocuteur suit les réaction de l'autre, essayant de déchiffrer ses messages non-verbaux, où il cherche l'approbation, la sympathie ou la compréhension.

Kellner considère qu'une concentration excessive sur le texte et ses récepteurs au détriment de l'analyse des relations et des institutions sociales où ces textes sont produits et consommés, ne fait que tronquer les études culturelles; la même chose se passe avec l'analyse de la réception, qui ne réussit pas à indiquer la manière dans laquelle le public consommateur est lui-même un produit dans le cadre des relations sociales, ni comment la culture contribue elle-même, dans une certaine mesure, à produire un public et à imposer la manière de réception du texte (Kellner, D., 2001, p. 50-51).

Pour la production et la transmission des messages il faut avoir des codes de communication. Ceux-ci représentent l'union de deux composantes: un répertoire de signes et des règles d'assamblage de ces signes, qui permettent la production de messages significatifs, intelligibles et porteurs d'information. Pour communiquer, les hommes disposent de codes linguistiques (les langues naturelles, par exemple, l'anglais, l'italien, le roumain etc.). Le code d'une langue comprend un répertoire de mots (le lexique, le vocabulaire de la langue respective) et un ensemble de règles (la grammaire, la syntaxe de la langue respective). En respectant le code d'une langue, on peut communiquer des messages significatifs à un récepteur qui connaît lui aussi le code de la langue respective, chose qui suppose deux opérations: la codification et la décodification.

Dans la communication linguistique, le problème de la codification et de la décodification se pose en liaison avec: la variabilité des énoncés linguistiques, chaque individu ayant sa manière personnelle d'utiliser la langue, les mots, la syntaxe, l'intonation etc. (la compétence linguistique suppose la connaissance du code de la langue utilisée, mais aussi la capacité de comprendre des énoncés composés); la polisémie des signes linguistiques (les mots peuvent signifier des choses différentes) et la synonymie (plusieurs mots ont le même sens). Décodifier un message signifie choisir la signification d'un ensemble de signes, en fonction du contexte linguistique. La codification et la décodification de l'ensemble de signes peut être dénotative ou connotative. La dénotation est propre à l'utilisation des signes qui ont une définition précise, et la connotation correspond à ce que les signes (les mots) évoquent ou représentent pour nous (souvenirs, sentiments). La codification et la décodification des messages, tout comme la communication dans son

ensemble, implique aussi le processus d'interprétation: le sens que le récepteur donne au message en fonction du contexte de la communication, où interviennent la personnalité, l'expérience, l'état d'esprit, les sentiments réciproques, l'interaction de ceux qui communiquent, etc.

L'idée de code s'appuie sur le fait que les personnes qui communiquent disposent d'un répertoire de symboles dont on va sélectionner ceux qui seront combinés conformément à certaines règles. Chaque code est représenté par deux axes: l'un vertical – paradigmatique (le répertoire de symboles d'où on opère la sélection) et l'autre horizontal – syntagmatique, dans lequel on opère la combinaison.

Dans le processus de communication, codifier signifie traduire des pensées, des attitudes, des émotions et des sentiments dans des gestes, des sons, des images, des dessins etc. La décodification représente l'acte symétrique de retransposer des mots parlés ou écrits, des gestes, des images ou n'importe quels autres signes et signaux, en émotions, concepts, idées, attitudes, opinions et comportements humains. Pratiquement, dans la mesure où le langage et le code sont connus, la décodification a lieu en écoutant, en lisant, en regardant, etc. Nous observons que l'action de codification est complémentaire et simultanée à celle de décodification: pendant que nous parlons, nous déchiffrons les réactions que notre message provoque à l'interlocuteur. Les informations digitales peuvent être réceptionnées seulement dans un langage reconnu par le récepteur, mais celles analogiques n'ont pas besoin à tout prix de codes. Les messages peuvent être des symboles et des signaux sonores, des gestes, des dessins, des couleurs, etc., porteurs de significations. La finalité du processus de communication existe dans la mesure où le message codifié par l'émetteur est décodifié et accepté par le récepteur.

Le message, considéré comme un élément du circuit de la communication, c'est la signification (l'information, la nouvelle, l'idée, l'émotion, le sentiment) expédiée par l'émetteur, transmise par un canal, reçue et intégrée par le récepteur (Şoitu, L., 1997, p. 17). Si le message est la signification, et la signification est le contenu de la communication, il n'existe pas en soi, en dehors de la relation, sans prendre une forme. Dans la communication humaine, la relation prédomine sur le contenu et «comment» sur «que (qu'est-ce que)». Lorsque la signification est codifiée dans des mots, nous disons que le message et la communication sont verbaux, et lorsque la signification est relevée par autre chose que les mots (gestes, mimique, posture), nous disons que le message et la communication sont non-verbaux. Il est important à

remarquer le fait que le message peut être décrit aussi comme élément d'un processus de représentation, comme intermédiaire entre la réalité et l'image de cette réalité, mais cet aspect reste souvent inconnu. Dans la théorie de la communication il y a la tendance de limiter l'étude au message proprement-dit, en ignorant dans son contenu la réalité à laquelle il se réfère. Or, cette double situation du message à l'intersection de deux processus — la communication et la représentation — présente un intérêt à part pour les acteurs de l'action et pour les résultats de celle-ci.

Le message est transmis et distribué par un canal de communication. Dans la communication interhumaine on emploie rarement un seul canal. Même dans le cadre de la plus banale conversation face-à-face on a affaire à deux ou plusieurs canaux: nous parlons et nous écoutons des mots (canal vocal et auditif), nous regardons et nous faisons des gestes (canal visuel).

Dans le processus de communication se produisent des effets sur les participants à la communication, c'est-à-dire sur ceux qui, d'une part, créent et émettent et, d'autre part, réceptionnent et interprètent des messages. La communication a sur les interlocuteurs des effets de nature cognitive, affective ou comportementale. Les effets de nature cognitive regardent l'acquisition d'information et de connaissance au niveau du logos, par des processus d'analyse, de synthèse, d'induction et déduction; les effets de nature affective regardent la création de réactions émotives, de sentiments, d'émotions, d'attitudes ou leur modification, au niveau somatique ou émotionnel, par des processus de conditionnement physiologique et psychosomatique; les effets comportementaux se produisent dans le plan de l'éthos et regardent l'apprentissage de conduites, de normes, de croyances, de gestes, d'habiletés et de mouvements qui influencent la manière d'actionner. Mais les effets de la communication ne doivent pas être confondus avec les réponses du récepteur du message (Prutianu, Ș., 2000, vol. 1, p. 41). La réponse (le *feed-back*) est le message du récepteur qui apparaît comme réaction au stimulus transmis par l'émetteur. La réponse dépend dans une grande mesure des conditions qui assurent une bonne réception du message de l'émetteur.

Les premières définitions de la communication décrivent les mécanismes qui favorisent le développement des relations humaines et insistent sur les phénomènes de symbolisation, et sur les mécanismes de transmission des contenus. La communication est en même temps un processus et le résultat de ce processus. Ces définitions donneront naissance, vers la fin de la quatrième décennie du siècle passé, à ce que A. Moles a nommé «le schéma canonique de la communication»,

qui implique: un émetteur, qui peut être un individu ou un groupe d'individus, une administration etc. (le «destinateur» de Jakobson); un canal physique, défini ou non-défini, sur lequel circule les messages, des séquences ordonnées d'éléments connus; un récepteur qui, soumis à ces messages, aura un certain comportement observé, résultat de l'expérience à laquelle il participe (le «destinataire» de Jakobson); un répertoire de signes ou d'éléments communs dont l'émetteur se sert pour créer un message selon certains signes (code) et dans lequel le récepteur cherchera d'identifier la nature des éléments reçus (la décodification). Selon A. Moles, la théorie de la communication est en essence une théorie structuraliste, car elle se propose de décomposer l'univers en des fragments de connaissance, étant capable de faire un catalogue de ceux-ci, pour recomposer ensuite un modèle, en appliquant certaines règles d'assemblage ou d'interdiction.

Le schéma canonique de la communication a fait l'objet des adjonctions successives dues à des auteurs appartenant à des horizons scientifiques différents, constituant le point de départ pour l'élaboration de la plupart des modèles de la communication. Dès la deuxième moitié du siècle passé, plusieurs modèles théoriques de la communication ont pris contour successivement, inspirés des diverses sciences: mathématiques, physique, informatique, cybernétique, psychologie, sociologie, linguistique, sémiotique etc.

L'un des premiers modèles de la communication est le «modèle de la théorie de l'information», connu aussi sous le nom du «modèle Shannon et Weaver» élaboré en 1949. Selon ce modèle, l'information doit être comprise comme mesure de ce qui est transmis de l'émetteur vers le récepteur, comme mesure de l'incertitude du système; elle ne s'identifie pas à la signification de ce qui est transmis. De cette manière, la communication est définie comme transmission d'information d'un émetteur vers un récepteur, par l'intermédiaire d'un canal. Par conséquent, la communication est identifiée à l'information, et celle-ci à la transmission de signaux. Nous observons que les notions principales du modèle sont d'ordre technique: émetteur, canal, code, récepteur; la notion de message occupe une place périphérique dans le modèle de la théorie de l'information, parce que ses auteurs ne posent pas le problème de la signification.

Le modèle de la théorie de l'information de Shannon et Weaver est un modèle abstrait, mathématique, de conception du processus communicatif, où le terme d'information n'est lié tant à ce qu'on dit, mais plutôt à ce qu'on pourrait dire. Cela signifie que l'information est une mesure de la liberté de choix dont on dispose lorsqu'on choisit un message. Le concept d'information ne s'applique pas aux messages

individuels (comme dans le cas du concept de signification), mais plutôt à la situation globale; l'unité d'information indique le fait qu'on dispose, dans cette situation, d'une certaine liberté dans la sélection des messages.

Décrivant la communication comme une processation d'information, la théorie de l'information est intéressée premièrement au problème de la définition et du mesurement de la quantité d'information d'un message. Les souteneurs de cette théorie définissent l'information par rapport à son opposé, le hasard ou l'entropie, et lui attribue le rôle de réduire l'incertitude engendrée par le hasard. Ils apprécient que toute la problématique de l'incertitude peut être réduite à une série de questions du type «oui» ou «non», et le nombre des questions nécessaires pour résoudre un problème représente la mesure quantitative nécessaire pour appliquer la théorie à l'analyse de la communication. Selon Shannon, l'information n'est pas incertitude, elle est celle qui réduit l'incertitude. La quantité d'information que nous obtenons lorsqu'un événement se produit est égale à la quantité d'incertitude qui était associée avant cet événement.

Nous pourrions dire que l'information (selon le modèle mathématique de Shannon et Weaver) est celle qui réduit, par sa transmission, l'ignorance et l'incertitude concernant l'état d'une situation donnée et agrandit la capacité d'organisation, de structuration et de fonctionnement d'un système donné. Pour Shannon et Weaver, l'information représente l'inverse de l'entropie, l'information est non-entropique (elle tend vers l'ordre), pendant que l'entropie tend vers le désordre et la dégradation.

Les principales critiques apportées au modèle de Shannon et Weaver vise le fait que celui-ci ne tient pas compte de l'interaction avec le récepteur, du rôle des réseaux de communication et néglige la composante sémantique des messages. On a considéré aussi que la théorie mathématique de l'information ne peut pas constituer un repère significatif pour penser la communication dans toutes ses formes, puisqu'on ne peut pas réduire tout processus de communication à un échange d'informations.

Du modèle mathématique de Shannon et Weaver s'est développé «le modèle cybernétique» de la communication. Selon ce modèle, la communication humaine est analogue à un dispositif de communication entre des machines capables de transmettre et d'interpréter des ordres, de réagir aux signaux reçus. Le schéma de la communication spécifique à ce modèle met en évidence que tout système (machine, organisme, organisation) est comme une «boîte noire» dotée d'une «entrée» (*input*) et d'une «sortie» (*output*) et qui possède une fonction

de transformation, permettant l'anticipation de l'effet («de la sortie») partant de l'«entrée». Une fois avec le développement de la cybernétique, dans l'étude de la communication on a introduit de nouveaux concepts, comme ceux de «feed-back», «autoréglage», «redondance» etc.

Ce débat a eu déjà lieu au long des années '70, principalement comme une réaction au «linéarisme» de la théorie mathématique de l'information et au fait qu'elle excluait la prise en considération de toute signification. La plupart des auteurs considéraient alors la théorie de l'information (celle-ci conçue comme une réduction de l'incertitude) comme un chapitre de la théorie générale de la communication, qui se montre plus riche, le feed-back (ou la rétro-action) lui permettant de tenir compte des lecteurs ou des utilisateurs.

En moins de 50 ans, les fondements théoriques des sciences de l'information et de la communication se sont précisés et enrichis par de multiples apports. Aux trois courants fondateurs initiaux (le modèle cybernétique, l'approche empirique-fonctionnelle des mass-media, la méthode structurale dans ses applications linguistiques) — courants qui, malgré les repoussements et les critiques, occupent une place centrale — on a ajouté récemment des problématiques spécifiques qui ont renouvelé en profondeur la pensée communicationnelle et, par cela, les recherches concernant l'information et la communication. Parmi ces problématiques nous mentionnons: l'ethnographie de la communication, l'ethnométhodologie et la sociologie des interactions sociales, les sociologies de la technique, les études sur la réception des messages et les nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication.

Pour N. Wiener, l'un des principaux souteneurs du modèle cybernétique, l'information désigne le contenu de ce qui se change dans les rapports avec le monde extérieur à mesure que nous nous y adaptons et nous lui appliquons les résultats de notre adaptation. Le processus qui consiste dans la réception et l'utilisation de l'information est le processus que nous suivons pour nous adapter aux contingences du milieu ambiant et pour vivre de manière efficiente dans ce milieu, et les laboratoires scientifiques, les universités, les bibliothèques et les manuels sont obligés de satisfaire les nécessités de ce processus, car autrement ils n'attiront pas leur but. Vivre efficacement signifie vivre avec une information adéquate. Ainsi, la communication et le réglage regarde l'essence de la vie intérieure de l'homme, même s'ils se réfèrent à sa vie dans la société.

Nous remarquons le fait que le modèle cybernétique (étant un modèle analogique appuis sur l'informatique), du moins dans sa variante initiale, est moins préoccupé par les problèmes du sens, de

l'intentionnalité, propres à la communication humaine. Mais plus tard, dans les années '80, on a formulé des modèles mathématiques intégrateurs, qui expriment plus profondément la logique des processus de communication, utilisant les données offertes par les sciences humaines de la communication (linguistique, sémiotique, les sciences cognitives etc.). En ce qui concerne les sciences cognitives, nous mettons en évidence que celles-ci se sont développées en même temps que le mouvement cybernétique, après la deuxième moitié du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, lorsque l'utilisation de l'ordinateur devient une certitude des temps respectifs et une porte vers l'avenir. Les sciences cognitives ont contribué à la compréhension du fait que le fonctionnement du cerveau humain est semblable à un dispositif d'usinage de l'information, qui réagit de manière sélective au milieu, à l'information venue du monde extérieur. Le spécifique de ce fonctionnement est mis en évidence, par exemple, de la dualité, sous sa forme épistémologique, du concept de «temps». Si nous utilisons le même mot «temps», il a une signification différente en relation avec le cerveau et en relation avec l'esprit, selon G. Ryle. Ils n'ont pas de contenus comparables, non pas parce que ceux-ci seraient différents, mais puisqu'ils font partie de réseaux conceptuels radicalement différents; lorsque nous parlons du «temps du cerveau», nous utilisons des termes comme: «réseau», «neurone», «input», «output», «feed-back» etc., et lorsque nous parlons du «temps psychologique» nous utilisons des termes comme: «intention», «désir», «intellecte», «impulse», «réflexion», «décision» etc. Les termes de la première catégorie nous aident à déterminer (et éventuellement à mesurer) le temps des processus cérébraux; la deuxième catégorie nous permet de comprendre les comportements de nos semblables. Les deux concepts répondent donc à des intérêts cognitifs radicalement différents (Kun, P., 1996, p.166).

L'une des applications les plus importantes du modèle cybernétique consiste dans la communication entremise électroniquement. La présence de l'ordinateur dans le processus de communication a modifié la relation entre l'émetteur et le récepteur par l'occupation d'une place dans la sphère de tous les deux. L'ordinateur, qui peut être, actuellement, programmé tant comme émetteur que comme récepteur, a modifié de manière substantielle la position du facteur humain dans le processus de communication; le sujet humain n'est plus seulement le bénéficiaire des informations, mais il occupe, dans sa relation avec l'ordinateur, le rôle d'opérateur et, en même temps, le rôle de co-participant. Généralement, s'il s'agit de la communication du type homme-ordinateur ou de n'importe quel autre type et situation de communication, dans l'analyse de la réception de l'information il faut

avoir en vue la formulation de la part du sujet émetteur d'un «prisme du récepteur» ayant le rôle de norme gardée en permanence dans le déroulement des phases de la communication. Pendant le transfert d'information, le locuteur et son interlocuteur respectent certaines règles ou standards rationnels qui, pris globalement, gouvernent l'acte communicationnel.

La communication entremise électroniquement a un rôle important et déterminant dans le cadre de la culture contemporaine; cet aspect avec des implications théoriques et pratiques a constitué l'objet des recherches de plusieurs auteurs, parmi lesquels se trouve Poster. Il apprécie que l'apparition de la culture postmoderne doit être considérée, de la manière la plus sérieuse, une conséquence de la dissémination des technologies qui reconfigurent l'espace et le temps, la relation de l'homme avec la machine et de l'esprit avec l'objet. Au fur et à mesure que ces technologies sont installées dans l'espace par des pratiques spécifiques, elles changent sévèrement les conditions dans lesquelles le sujet est constitué — justement le sujet qui écrit l'histoire. L'apparition des modules électroniques et, ultérieurement, digitaux de transmission de l'information, fait possibles de nouveaux points de vue sur le passé. L'histoire doit prendre en considération le nouveau contexte de la virtualisation et de la globalisation des pratiques de communication, des pratiques qui modifient sans doute les courants intellectuels et le domaine de la culture en général (Constantinescu, M., 2001, p. 20-22, 179-181).

La fin du deuxième millénaire et le début du troisième sont caractérisés par l'interférence homme-ordinateur. L'informatisation de la société est comprise comme un processus de la communication de l'information. L'information, dans ce contexte, représente la matière première et, en même temps, la moyen de modification des mentalités, de certaines attitudes ou structures. La période contemporaine est caractérisée par le fait que la pensée est interrogée de la perspective du pouvoir organisateur du langage, la connaissance est analysée du côté de la communication. De cette manière, nous considérons qu'on réalise la liaison entre la communication et la connaissance, par l'intermédiaire de la compréhension. Bien que les ordinateurs soient créés en vue de capter, de monter et d'offrir des images en mouvement, dans l'espoir de réaliser un progrès de la connaissance, la communication réalisée par leur intermédiaire présente pourtant certains inconvénients: la mise sous le signe du doute des vérités fondamentales, la reconfiguration de la réalité, la destruction des normes et la suppression du canon.

Le modèle cybernétique est, selon B. Miège, incontestablement fondateur (Miège, B., 1998, p. 26), et aujourd'hui il continue à occuper

une place importante dans les réflexions sur la communication, même s'il est critiquable puisqu'il ne pose pas l'accent sur les aspects concernant le sens, l'interaction et la compréhension réciproque, spécifiques à la communication humaine. Les limites de ce modèle, tout comme celles du modèle mathématique, qui réduisait la communication à la transmission d'information, ont été dépassées par le modèle proposé par l'École de Palo Alto.

Le modèle «communicationnel» élaboré à l'École de Palo Alto met l'accent sur l'intersubjectivité. Dans la vision des représentants de cette école, la communication n'est pas une simple manière d'exprimer et d'expliquer la réalité. D'ailleurs, il n'y a pas une seule réalité, mais de diverses versions de celle-ci, dont les unes peuvent être contradictoires, toutes constituant des effets de la communication et non pas la réflexion de quelques vérités objectives et éternes. La communication ne se réduit pas, comme disaient les auteurs des modèles classiques, à la transmission de l'information et des messages par la codification et la décodification. La communication doit être comprise comme une «compréhension réciproque», comme une «intercompréhension», elle permettant l'accès à la subjectivité de l'autre, à ses intentions et à ses motifs.

Les représentants de l'École de Palo Alto mettent de côté même les notions d'émetteur et de récepteur. Ceux-ci considèrent la communication comme étant non seulement circulaire, mais aussi continue, supposant une interaction ininterrompue entre les êtres humains, déroulée simultanément par de multiples canaux et par des moyens variés. La notion classique de message est elle-aussi dépassée, puisque plus importantes que les contenus de la communication sont les interactions entre ceux qui participent à la communication. La communication est semblable à une orchestre sans chef d'orchestre, où chacun interagit avec tous et tous entre eux, et par ce processus d'interactions continues on crée la réalité sociale communicationnelle. Renonçant à l'idée caractéristique aux modèles initiaux de limiter la communication à l'émission et la réception des messages univoques, circulant sur un seul canal et à un récepteur passif, le nouveau modèle, ayant l'accent mis sur la circularité de la communication, sur l'importance du contexte social et culturel, ouvre la voie d'une approche de plus en plus complexe du processus communicatif.

Empruntant des concepts de la démarche systémique, mais aussi de la linguistique et de la logique, les chercheurs de l'École de Palo Alto essaient d'expliquer une situation globale d'interaction et non seulement d'étudier quelques variables prises isolément. Ils s'appuient

sur trois hypothèses, mises en évidence par P. Watzlawick et ses collaborateurs, J. Beavin et D. Jackson, dans l'ouvrage *Pragmatics of Human Communication* (1967):

l'essence de la communication réside dans les processus relationnels et interactionnels (les éléments comptent moins que les rapports qui s'établissent entre eux); tout comportement humain a une valeur communicative (les relations qui se correspondent et s'impliquent réciproquement peuvent être considérées un vaste système de communication); observant la succession des messages situés dans leur contexte horizontal (la séquence des messages successifs) et dans leur contexte vertical (la relation entre l'élément et le système), il est possible de d'en extraire une «logique de la communication».

À la notion de communication isolée comme acte verbal conscient et volontaire, qui sous-tend la sociologie fonctionnaliste, on opposait l'idée de la communication comme processus social permanent, intégrant des manières multiples de comportement: les mots, le geste, le regard, l'espace interindividuel. Ainsi, ces chercheurs s'intéressent à la gestualité (kinésique) et à l'espace interpersonnel (proxémique) ou ils montrent que les accidents du comportement humain se rapportent au milieu social (les troubles psychiques envoient à des perturbations de la communication entre l'individu porteur du symptôme et son entourage); analysant la communication comme un processus interactionnel, pour percevoir l'apparition de la signification, le chercheur doit décrire le fonctionnement de certaines manières de comportement différentes dans un contexte donné. Il faut avoir lieu la crise des modèles macrosociologiques, contemporaine au retour aux espaces de proximité pour qu'à la fin, dans les années '80, soit reconnue la contribution décisive de l'École de Palo Alto à une théorie sur les processus de communication comme interactions (Mattelart, A., 2001, pp. 50-54).

Il est important de retenir le fait que les membres du Collège invisible, connu aussi sous le nom de l'École de Palo Alto, ont contribué au fondement d'une théorie interactionniste de la communication.

U. Eco affirme qu'

«au niveau de la machine nous étions encore dans l'univers de la cybernétique qui s'intéresse au signal. Y introduisant l'homme, nous sommes passés dans l'univers du sens. Un processus de signification s'est ouvert, puisque le signe n'est plus une série d'unités séparées, mesurables en bite d'information, mais une

forme signifiante que le destinataire humain devra remplir de signification. Nous sommes passés d'une théorie mathématique de l'information à une théorie générale de la communication, à une sémiologie» (Eco, U., 1969, p. 97).

Pour la période contemporaine, le monde est donné par la communication, par la signification et la chose est seulement un signe parmi des signes. Le signe est primordial, parce que le monde n'existe que dans la mesure où la langue existe, et la connaissance est relative à la communication, puisque l'ordre de la communication est préalable à la connaissance. Le milieu se constitue au niveau des stimuli et des indices, des signes et des symptômes, pendant que le monde ne peut apparaître qu'au niveau des signes. Ce qui existe et que nous connaissons comme réalité est relatif à la communication; ce que nous ne communiquons pas n'existe pas. Autrement dit, nous communiquons ce qui existe et que nous connaissons, et ce que nous communiquons doit être compris par l'interlocuteur.

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## FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS IN SEMANTICS

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### 1. The status of explanation in semantics

Explanations should comprise a list of potential changes, a definition of the elements that enable a speaker to actualise any of these potentialities and a discussion about the manner in which such a change is diffused into the speaking community.

The underlying reasoning of the second stage is the following: if one can account for the reason why a speaker alters his linguistic habits, one can thereby reach a generic level of one's attempts at explanation and can, therefore, see through the motives for which the speakers of a community do as the individual speaker does.

A mechanism of change should not be mixed up with the cause of change. A mechanism points out the potentialities for change, while a cause points out why one instance of all the potential cases is actualised. That is why the traditional mechanisms of semantic change define what one calls the "space of possible developments", they show in what way new meanings and even new words can be linked up with extant meanings and words (cf. Geeraerts, 1986: 70).

Causes of semantic change show why these potential cases are actualised. The (ultimate) causes of change should state why for example, a potential metaphorical widening of a lexical concept is actualised.

Functional explanations are, according to Nagel 1969 (*Apud* Itkonen, 1983: 80) teleological explanations, which means that they refer to

"goals and functions that system entertains or fulfils" [...].

They

“take the form of indicating one or more functions [...] that a unit performs in maintaining certain traits for a system to which the unit belongs, or of stating the instrumental role an action plays in bringing about some goal”.

Teleological explanations thus entail two kinds of actions: the first one deals with conscious action with preconceived goals or some purposive action, and the second one deals with the specification of the function of a certain unit.

<b>Types of teleological explanations</b>	
First Type entails:	Second Type entails:
Singular actions	Permanent structures and their operation
Particular goals	General functions (and their prerequisites)
Deliberate (purposive, conscious) action	Unconscious processes

(after Geeraerts, 1986: 71)

This distinction prompted by Geeraerts (1986) is meant to smooth out the way for a preliminary division of the functional causes of semantic change.

The first type of teleological explanation brings into play the main function and the *raison d' être* of natural languages: communication. “Why do speakers employ language?” sounds like a rhetorical question. Speakers make use of language in order to express their ideas, feelings etc. From this point of use, their expressive, communicative intentions cause linguistic change.

“The expressive means of a language change because people want to express something for which they have no adequate means of expression.” (Geeraerts, 1997:68).

Communicative needs can be spelled out in a broader framework.

We shall go into the types of lexical meaning (see also Leith, 1995: 72-73 and Geeraerts, 1986: 73).

The conceptual meaning is made up of what the speakers refer to. It is also called referential or denotational. The conceptual meaning of two synonyms stands for the irreducible core of meaning. Leith remarks that

“many arguments about the real meanings of words are based on an assumption of identity between word and referent”.

Such ‘magical thinking’ has often played an important part in so-called primitive societies.

Our conceptualisations are subject to change. They are of different kinds: formal, functional and evaluative.

The connotational or emotional meaning is the expression of the speakers’ attitudes regarding the referred to conceptual meaning. Although the connotations of a word may vary from one speaker to another they are not utterly subjective or personal. What they sometimes do is mirror the values to which a certain group sticks at a certain time. Derogatory terms may be strong in a certain order as they all belong to the emotional meaning.

The stylistic meaning is defined by the adequateness of a certain word to certain contexts of use hanging upon the social layers of the discourse. Stylistics meaning ‘betrays’ the speaker’s own social position. From a historical standpoint, stylistic meanings unfold as the language develops functionally, and certain words are specialised in certain domains of usage.

The grammatical meaning covers the syntactic properties and morphological features. Morphological class is co-expressed by the denotational meaning, which treats ‘to fare’ and ‘fare’ differently.

The reflected meaning involves the interplay of at least two meanings developed by some words diachronically.

For example ‘dear’ (cf. Leith, 1995: 73) originally denoted “things of great value”, and was later applied to people in the sense ‘esteemed’ from which the sense ‘dear’ (beloved) subsequently arose. It is possible for poets to exploit both meanings, ‘costly’ and ‘beloved’, so that such words in certain contexts may be said to reflect both”.

The collocational meaning implies that two words may be synonymous but they customarily keep other words company. Thus each word has idiosyncratic (collocational) features. If this collocational meaning is the sum of the contexts in which a certain word appears, it follows that even if two words are synonymous, they are not interchangeable, as their contexts do not wholly overlap. The internal rules that show which words can match with a certain word belong to the meaning of our word.

Widening or shrinking of the collocational range often sets off changes in meaning. And, let us not forget,

“one change in the semantic make-up of a word may cause a meaning change in another word(s) [...]. Words enter also into another series of relationships with other words, forming little systems of meaning: ‘big’ patterns with ‘large’ on one scale, with ‘gigantic’ on another, with ‘small’ on yet another, and so on. Thus, it is unwise to pluck a single word from its network, and discuss it in isolation, as it so often done; we should keep an eye on the fortunes of its peers” (Leith, 1995: 73).

The pragmatic or discursive meaning refers to the

“conventional conversational value, such as the fact that ‘please’ (basically a verb) can be used as an interjection indicating that an utterance has the pragmatic value of being a request” (Geeraerts, 1986: 73).

For convenience sake, our explanation will lean only on denotational, connotational and stylistic meaning. Referential expressive needs crop up when the outside reality undergoes a change (a new object is accepted into our culture and we make up or borrow a term: ‘quark’, ‘root’) or when our outlook on the outside reality shifts. The aftermath of expressive needs in the connotational field is manifest in euphemisms. It is always comfortable to have a somewhat milder alternative like ‘vertically challenged’ for ‘short’ or ‘coloured person’ for ‘Negro’. Stylistic expressivity thrives in ‘in-crowd’ phrases and words as ‘markers of a particular social group (think of army slang or school boy slang)” (see also Geeraerts, 1986: 74).

Following Koefoed (*Apud* Geeraerts, 1997: 48) we find some differences between denotational and stylistic meanings: the former refers to the primary “cognitief-communicatieve” function of language, while the latter refers to its secondary, “sociaal-culturele” function. Concisely said, denotational meaning “exists because language refers to the world” and stylistic meaning “exists because language contains formal variation”. The table below captures the essence:

<b>Systematical differences between:</b>	
Denotational meaning	Stylistic meaning
Communicates something about the referent of the utterance	Communicates something about the speaker of the utterance
involves the cognitive function of	

language may be found on the level of the signified	involves the social function of language  may be found on the level of the signifier
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(after Geeraerts, 1986: 74)

Where do we find connotational meaning? As connotational meaning says something about the speaker, and as his utterance bears upon the referent, we should fit connotational meaning somewhere between denotational and stylistic meaning. We should then distinguish between types of meaning that bring into play only the referential level and types of meaning that bring the formal level into play.

We deem expressivity to be wider in scope than communicative intention as there can be instances of someone being expressive without his overtly intending to communicate.

“The soldiers’ slang reveals something about their state of mind even if they have no explicit intention to convey whatsoever about it” (see Sperber, 1965, Geeraerts 1986).

The second kind of teleological explanation comes to the fore in the attempt to account for the lexical loss in order to avoid homonymy clash. If the impending danger of confusion in communication lurks behind the ousting of a certain word, this is currently put down to the Humboldtian isomorphic principle according to which natural language strives towards biunique relationships: one meaning should correspond to one form and vice-versa. Isomorphy is also obvious in avoidance of polysemy and proportional analogy. This principle stands out as an explanation of the second type. It dwells on structure, on the link between form and meaning, it refers to overall working procedures in language (avoidance and communicative confusion) and it refers to changes that are cybernetic and self-contained.

The Humboldtian principle qualifies as an efficiency principle: it makes for a smooth flow of communication, free of ambiguity and errors. Geeraerts is right when he places the Humboldtian principle under the heading of

“functional causes that involve the linguistic form (and more particularly, the relationship between form and meaning)” (Geeraerts, 1986).

Another instantiation of efficiency is semantic transparency in folk etymology. Both isomorphic and transparency principles belong to the formal level.

Isomorphy points out to the fact that the vocabulary make-up is based on functional grounds. So is the organisation of conceptual categories. More than that, the conceptual categories are instances of prototypical kernels with fringe occurrences swarming round these. Granted that prototypical organisation of conceptual categories, we shall be able to shape our arguments in a functional mode.

There are three functional prerequisites that the conceptual system must fulfil. The first is informational density as described by Eleanor Rosch (1977):

“it is cognitively advantageous to lump as much information as possible into one’s conceptual categories. Making conceptual categories as informatively dense as possible enables one to retrieve the most information with least effort”.

Such an organisation reaches such a level of informational density as there are categories containing a hierarchy of concepts, sub-concepts and shades of meaning. The second and the third prerequisites make up the dialectic interplay of flexibility and structural stability. A category must be flexible to adjust itself to the ever-shifting reality. And at the same time, categories must be relatively stable in order to merge as efficient in dealing with the new conditions of reality. The sprouting of fringe shades within the categories reveals their readiness to cope with the ever shifting referential and cognitive demands. If peripherally swerving concepts can still be engulfed by extant categories, this proves the validity and stability of the extant categories to preserve their individuality and their general structure. The prototypical character of categories lends efficiency to the organisation of cognition. They allow the speaker or hearer to read the new incoming data in virtue of the already extant concepts. Human cognition “welcomes” prototypical categories as they help human cognition to work efficiently, meeting the three demands: informational density, flexibility and structural stability.

We have to set some limits to the flexibility of the conceptual structure. These restrictions spell out the principles governing the widening of the concepts. Traditional mechanisms of association, be they metaphors or metonymies, play this role in that they confine the types of conceptual extensions to the changes that are canonically set off by the above mentioned metaphors and metonymies. Ullman’s

traditional categories may be fitted into a functional classification of the causes of semantic change.

An excellent summary of the functional causes is made, by Geeraerts in (1986: 81). What we should add here is the fact that this schema fails to underline the simultaneous actualisation of more principles. For example, at the level of meaning, the efficiency principle entails some limits of association on semasiological change. It also entails that new meanings must be manifest within the frame of prototypical potentialities of an already extant lexical concept so that anyone can be capable of reading the new meaning leaning on the old meanings belonging to the lexeme under investigation. Thus, our efficiency principle fails to yield semantic changes all by itself but it imposes limits on series of changes that can be engendered by the other co-occurring principles.

	Principle of expressivity	Principle of efficiency
Level of meaning	Denotational expressive needs	Natural (Prototypical) categorisation
Level of form (and the relationship between form and meaning)	Stylistic expressive needs	Isomorphism Transparency

The communicative motivation to onomathesis of a hitherto unknown entity underlies the extension of meaning and this overshadows the efficiency principle which acts under the guise of limits on the new meaning that awaits its forthcoming birth into the word.

The new meaning has to be traced back in some way to the original meaning or to the prototypically organised set of meanings of our word. Prototypical flexibility accounts for the potentialities outlined by the above mentioned mechanisms (associative principles). The key word here is ASSOCIATION. The speaker 'reckons' the outcome, the new meaning, by falling back on, by associating it with the old (original) meaning(s).

The prototypical make-up of conceptual structure dialectically makes for the flexible employment of lexical categories and halts the random straggling of meanings beyond the boundaries of accessibility ("readability"), which accessibility works depending on the current mechanisms of conceptual association. (see Rosch, 1977; Taylor, 1995). As we suggested earlier, prototypical "readability", even if it

stands for a limitation on the working of the principle of expressivity, cannot act all alone.

The above schema also fails to capture the clash of principles. One instance occurs when the formal efficiency principle and the conceptual efficiency principle clash. The latter involves a trend toward polysemisation on account of its prototypical conception. As prototypical categories are made up of tightly packed semantic shades round a kernel meaning, it stands to reason that they should make the most of their own polysemic resources. The trend towards greater polysemy of lexemes runs counter to the Humboldtian principle of one form going with one meaning. The algorithmic solution sets forth an order, a hierarchy of these two principles. Geeraerts (1985: 34) demonstrates that the principle of prototypical efficiency overrides the principle of isomorphic efficiency and that

“certain types of evidence suggest that the operation of the Humboldtian principle is blocked by the tendency towards prototypical polysemisation. The evidence in question relates the two of the forms that the isomorphic principle can take, viz the avoidance of homonymy and the avoidance of polysemy”.

Actually, by gauging the relative saliency of different functional principles in clashing cases to a greater extent, we stand good chances of forecasting semantic directionality of change. Functional explanations in hermeneutic sciences and especially in semantics fall short of their performance of their counterparts in natural sciences, because these hermeneutic sciences seem to lack the experimental dimension. The true remark that changes are recorded a posteriori belongs in this context. How can expressive needs be made over into rigorous mathematical variables? To a limited extent, we believe that one can still try some predictions as to the algorithm of functional principles. Dirk Geeraerts (1986) formulates an overall, but rather statistic prediction:

“if a lexical-semantic configuration occurs in which both the tendency towards a Humboldtian isomorphism and the tendency towards prototype formation can be applied, the latter takes precedence over the former”.

The above prediction demonstrates in a de facto way that prediction is still possible in the light of the expounded theory and functional explanations are valid in diachronic semantics. This runs counter to Rudi Keller's pessimism regarding functional explanations leading to prediction.

## 2. Three epistemological stages in diachronic semantics

The outline of linguistic thinking concerning the topic of functional explanations of semantic change describes a spiral. We distinguish three periods when the fortune of diachronic semantics waxed and waned. The first period is the prestructuralist one, the second is the structuralist one and third is the cognitive one. Linguistic thinking goes through the three Hegelian-like stages: thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

The prestructuralist period saw the blooming of diachronic semantics. It recorded the works of Bréal, Meillet, and Stern. The prestructuralist age reached its peak around 1930 after which it declined and made way for structuralism. Functional explanations in prestructuralism focus on the expressivity principle. Roughly speaking, the cause of semantic change is deemed to be the effort of individual speakers to express and communicate their thoughts and feelings. Bréal (1897:8) is the quintessence of this age captured in the following words:

«Le but, en matière de langage, c'est d'être compris. L'enfant, pendant des mois, exerce sa langue à proferer des voyelles, à articuler des consonnes: combine d'avortements, avant de parvenir à prononcer clairement une syllabe! Les innovations grammaticales sont de la même sorte, avec cette différence que tout un peuple y collabore. Que des constructions maladroites, incorrectes, obscures, avant de trouver celle qui sera non par l'expression adéquate (il n'en est point), mais du moins suffisantes de la pensée».

The science of semantics sets itself up as an authentic hermeneutic science ("Geisteswissenschaft" in the Diltheyan sense) in search of the recovery of the original intention of the individual trying to express itself.

In the structuralist period, after the methodological breakthroughs of the lexical field (Trier) and componential analysis (Goodenough), diachronic semantics gave way to synchronic semantics, being banished to the outskirts of linguistics. Functional explanations were built on the efficiency principles, on the isomorphic principle as the cause of semantic change. If we look upon lexical fields and componential analysis as descriptive efforts, explanation focused on the avoidance of homonymy and polysemy, thus bringing out the Humboldtian isomorphic principle, which not only optimises structures of words and meanings, but it also sets up the linguistic sign as a unique connection between a signifier and a signified. Structuralism considers the isomorphic principle

as an example of the second type of functional explanation classified by Nagel (see Itkonen, 1983). As structuralism reacts against psychologism and conceives language as an autonomous system, it stands to reason why structuralism should lay great store by a kind of teleological explanation that does not lean on the will of a person as agenthood of change, but it requires objectively that the structure of a system should meet certain epistemological demands in order to work efficiently.

The cognitive age brings back the prestructuralist interest in expressivity as it shows the incompleteness of the efficiency principle (loved by structuralists) in explaining semantic change. It knits the two principles together in the overview of the causes of semantic change and it engulfs and methodologically surpasses the two foregoing streams of linguistic thought in the manner of Thomas Kuhn's famous model of scientific revolution.

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**ASPECTS OF THE TERRITORIAL CENTRALIZATION OF  
ROMANIAN EDUCATION**

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Defined as a form of political organization by power is concentrated in a single center, the "term" centralization designates the manner of functioning of the state, its role in social structuring. Indispensable to any political activities, centralization became ideologically compromised through the former, contradictory formula of "democratic centralism" which communists used to abuse, by means of which they justified their terrorization and enslaving of the citizens. More recently, the term "centralization" has been used to describe the authoritarian and totalitarian excesses of any kind as well as the attempts at sacrificing democracy and the rights of man in favour of occult political interests or even of utopias.

All states tend to increase their power, either extensively, by conquering new territories, or intensively by an even more rigorous control, is this becoming possible to more imperceptibly form necessary inevitable centralization, to a malign one, of totalitarian nature, in which the political organisms and, primarily, the police and the single party, control the entire social and individual life.

Political centralization is often accompanied by geographical centralization: overcrowding of the capital city, concentration of industry in a small number of areas. It so happens that sometimes the population of some capitals represents 20-35% of that entire country (Austria, Hungary, The Mongol Republic, Argentina). Of the other important effects of centralization, we mention: stimulation of bureaucracy by emphasis on statuses and roles, maintenance of a rigid and humiliating hierarchy and, above, all, the cult for the leader. Accentuation of the

elements of subdomination and domination brings about social imbalance, generating masked conflicts through aggressive foreign policy<sup>1</sup>.

In an attempt to characterize current Romanian education, Adrian Miroiu states that it is authoritarian, hypercentralized and hyper-hierarchized, the organization of own education would be based on the principle according to which those at the "low" level are infantilised and looked at as acephalous, in the absence of the "leading head". There is, in on education, an inflexible hierarchy, with the schoolchildren and the students at the bottom and the Ministry at the top. According to the territorial distribution of hierarchies there emerge all kind of national, country "town" "satrapies". A vicious circle is thus created

"each higher level calling the lower one to order. Practically, the unintentional product of this situation is the institution and the reproduction of the vassalage situation: inspector - principal (headmaster) - teacher -pupil"<sup>2</sup>.

In higher education, the question of the power positions is complex and it cannot be understood outside of the historic context of the past century. The communist regime, founded on dogmas and utopias, refused, from the start, any dialogue, so that traditional fields and study programs such as philosophy, psychology, which fed on conversation, were practically done away with. The science faculties advantage of the situation, providing the new regime with "arguments", the halls of its justification through "the gains of science and technology". The occult tendencies of the communist leaders and ideologies of smothering free thought and critical spirit by appealing to the "laws" of science, had a very strong impact upon academic life, the changes being radical. Cleansing and demoting were primarily directed at teachers of philosophy, psychology, pedagogy preference and promotion being enjoyed by the teachers in science faculties, teachers who showed "progressivist" or even neutral behavior during the old regime, based on their condition of "objective" men of science<sup>3</sup>.

On analysing the extremely complex psychosocial and political problems created by the communist regime in academic life, Adrian Neculau describes the mechanism of the functioning and development of the new power position:

"Science faculties grow in number and new power centers are being set up in the academic area (institutes), and this illustrates the new ideological orientation - the social competence of science. Science and technology are being placed 'in the service of the

people', they are the new myths in the name of which prestige, position, advantages are being gained. And the body of specialists in these fields often provide the staff reserve for the ideological field, for leadership position. The engineers, the technical intelligentsia, occupy the most important positions in the field of power<sup>4</sup>.

Alongside centralization of decisions we also notice a spatial, geographical centralization of education. This phenomenon is easily seen in higher education and it manifests itself by increase in the number of students and teachers in Bucharest, to the detriment of other areas. The share of the capital in the total number of students increased from 37.7% in the 1989 academic year to 40.6% in 1995/1996. It is true that starting with 1996/1997 the number of students decreased permanently (38.62% in 1996/1997; 37.79% in 1997/1998; 36.12% in 1998/1999; 33.48% in 1999/2000), the decrease being slow, the share of the students in the capital staying at 32.42% in the 2000/2001 academic year (see Table no. 1). Moreover, the decrease in the number of staff went even more slowly: just form percentage points between 1996 and 2001 (37.80% in 1996/1997; 32.87% in 1997/1998; 34.20% in 1998/1999; 34.19% in 1999/2000 and 33.59% in 2000/2001) (See table no.2). It seems that between 1997 and 1998 there occurred a transfer of teachers from the capital to the provinces (probably in the context of stimulating academic centers outside (Bucharest), but the reaction of the transferred teacher was negative, they tending to go back.

Phenomenal similar to those in Bucharest also occurred in the other three big academic centers. In Iasi, the share of students and teachers was: 10.94% and 14.04% in 1996/1997; 10.24% and 13.63% in 1997/1998; 9.86% and 11.39% in 1998/1999; 9.58% and 12.83% in 1999/2000 and 9.45% and 13.4% in 2000/2001. The academic center of Cluj Napoca moved along the following coordinates: 10.33% and 11.36% in 1996/1997; 10.18% and 11.36% in 1997/1998; 10.23% and 11.38% in 1998/1999; 9.995 and 11.89% in 1999/2000 and 9.47% and 11.53% in 2000/2001. From the same indicators we find, in Timisoara, the following figures: 7.76% and 7.04 in 1996/1997; 8.20% and 10.85% in 1997/1998; 8.03% and 10.09% in 1998/1999, 7.98% and 10.03% in 1999/2000; 7.49% and 9.66% in 2000/2001 (See table no1).

In the year 2000, the population of Bucharest was a little above two millions inhabitants (2.009.200). The population of the other three big academic centers was around one million inhabitants, (Iasi - 345.795, Cluj Napoca - 329.216 and Timisoara - 329554). The seven big cities together had about three million inhabitants, that is, 13.4% of Romania's population of 22.435.205 inhabitants on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2000, but almost 60%

(58.724) of the total number of students and even 67.81% of the total number of university teachers. The number of students/number of inhabitants indicators reveals a striking imbalance: for the big academic centers, it's value was 0.1 (313.668 students in 3.013.765 inhabitants), while for the rest of the territory it's value was only 0.011 (219.484 students in 19.421.440 inhabitants), so over ten times lower. In other words, two areas were distinguished, having completely different academic characteristics, the first one consisting of the four academic centers where access to higher education was easy, and the second one, comprising the rest of Romania's territory where access was much more difficult.

The imbalances revealed had, even if they can be accounted for, within some limits, by the specificity of academic activities, nevertheless, a significant economic and social impact on the young people across most of the territory, they being obliged, practically, to travel and get accommodation, for long periods of time, in one of the four big academic centers. We are considering here not only the expenses, but also the physical and psychic effort necessary for getting used to a different place. In fact, in the situation of generalized impoverishment of Romania, most of the young people in the less favoured academic areas did not possess adequate financial resources and depended on the facilities and gratuities offered by the state. Others gave up their studies, postponed them for several years, striving in the meantime to put together the necessary funds.

The relative liberalization started with the authorization and accreditation of private higher education, did not have as its effect decentralization. On the contrary. Almost half of the private faculties (48%; 72.505 - see table no.3) are studying in Bucharest while the shares of the three big academic centers are lower in private education than in state education (Iasi - 6.43% as against 9.45%; Timisoara - 5.81% - 7.49%; and Cluj Napoca - 4.66% - 9.47%). Cluj Napoca has preferred state education and has been overcome, as concerns the number of students in private faculties, by the new centers such as Brasov and Constanta (7.036 as against 9.398 and 7.658 respectively) which have managed to use, for education, the accommodation facilities not used in the off-peak season.

Both tendencies which have become manifest in our higher education (the first one, of maintaining the bigger share of Bucharest, the second one, of proliferation of other academic centers: in the 2000/2001 academic year these existed higher education institutions operating in 55 places) are harmful. It would be preferable to have a balanced development by stimulating the traditional academic centers

(Iasi, Cluj Napoca, Timisoara) and of some relatively, new ones, which enjoy a good territorial location, such as: Oradea, Brasov, Craiova, Constanta, Bacau, Galati. In our opinion the territorial optimum would have the following structure: Bucharest - 25% of the total number of students, Iasi, Cluj Napoca and Timisoara, each having 10%, and the new centers 5%. Such an aim could be attained by relatively simple regulations: by moving some national institutions and some decision making bodies from Bucharest to Iasi, Cluj Napoca and Timisoara, by extending distance and correspondence education, by improving the structure of higher education through integration of means of continuing education, etc.

Differences still exist among counties not only as regards the share of university graduates (over 7% in Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj Napoca, Timisoara, Brasov, Constanta, Sibiu and less than 4% in 11 counties, of which 3 in Moldavia and 5 in Muntenia)<sup>5</sup> but also as regards coverage at all education levels. The rate of school non-coverage in primary and pre-academic education for children of 7-14 years of age was 6.7%, over the whole country, in 1995/1996 ranging between 4.1% (in Bucharest) and 15.65 (in Harghita). Besides Bucharest, there were rates of below 5% in the counties of Arges, Botosani and Iasi, while non-coverage rates of above 8% were registered in 10 counties, 7 of which are in Transylvania (Covasna, Harghita and Mures even exceeded 10%).

Important differences also exist as regards school coverage in secondary education. At one pole, there is Bucharest, with 85.3%, and, at the other, there is Giurgiu county with only 40.9%. In half of the country's counties, the coverage rate in secondary school education, during the 1995/1996 school year did not exceed 65%, the country coverage not exceeding 70% (68.6%). Analyzing these tendencies N. D. Niculescu and I. O. Adumitracesei, anticipated worriedly that

"there is the risk that the building in Romania, of a modern market economy and of a democratic society should be much hindered by restriction of the possibility, for a large number of children, of enjoying secondary-school education"<sup>6</sup>.

Although strong measures have been adopted over the last few years, including the "roll and milk" and the school transportation program, by means of which some of these tendencies have been stopped, adequate institutions are still lacking, which should carry out their activity at county level, which should keep a permanent record of school-age young people and, specially, stimulate their integration in school activities.

**Table no.1. The Dynamics of students between 1996-2001**

	1996-1997		1997-1998		1998-1999		1999-2000		2000-2001						
	Nr.	N	r.	N	r.	N	r.	N	r.	N					
uculesti	36904	1	8.62	36272	1	7.79	47331	1	6.13	51553	1	3.48	72876	1	2.42
asi	8774	3	0.94	6950	3	0.24	0237	4	.86	3368	4	.58	0376	5	.45
lujNapoa	6616	3	0.33	6731	3	0.18	1722	4	0.23	5228	4	.99	0484	5	.47
limi oara	7520	2	.76	9592	2	.20	2752	3	.03	6135	3	.98	9932	3	.49
raioara	5891	1	.48	5956	1	.42	8692	1	.58	1135	2	.67	5551	2	.79
raov	1430	1	.22	4701	1	.08	6732	1	.10	0573	2	.54	1375	2	.01
alati	808	7	.20	877	7	.18	0038	1	.46	1025	1	.44	4047	1	.63
onstanta	515	9	.68	0671	1	.96	2727	1	.12	5564	1	.44	2259	2	.17
Total	54448	3	00%	60590	3	00%	07720	4	00%	52621	4	00%	33152	5	00%

**Taken from the Statistical Year -Book 2001, p. 212-215**

**Table no. 2. The Dynamics of Teaching Staff in higher Education Between 1996-2001**

	1996-1997			1997-1998			1998-1999			1999-2000			2000-2001		
	r.	N	%												
Bucuresti	876	7.80		029	2.87		897	4.20		224	4.19		392	3.59	
Iasi	296	4.04		330	3.63		482	1.39		460	2.83		646	3.04	
Cluj Napoca	666	1.36		775	1.36		961	1.38		207	1.89		223	1.53	
Timisoara	654	.04		651	0.85		625	0.09		705	0.03		701	.66	
Arad	029	.38		112	.55		115	.29		244	.61		253	.48	
Brasov	68	.84		094	.48		76	.37		91	.30		36	.35	
Galati	54	.36		52	.26		71	.19		26	.32		28	.25	
Constanta	58	.80		48	.65		01	.08		48	.77		86	.17	
<b>Total</b>	<b>3477</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>4427</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>6013</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>6977</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>7959</b>	<b>100%</b>	

*Taken from the Statistical Year -Book 2001, p. 212-215*

**Table no. 3. The Main Private Higher Education Centers (Academic Year 2000-2001)**

Centers	Students number	%
Bucuresti	72.505	48.12
Iasi	9.689	6.43
Timisoara	8.758	5.81
Brasov	8.398	5.57
Constanta	7.658	5.08
Cluj Napoca	7.036	4.66
Arad	4.519	3.00
Craiova	3.656	2.43
Ramnic Valcea	2.738	1.82
Lugoj	2.572	1.70
Pitesti	2.527	1.68
Tirgu Mures	2.381	1.58
Galati	2.339	1.55
Alba Iulia	2.217	1.47
Bacau	2.033	1.35
Sibiu	2006	1.33
<b>Total</b>	<b>150.674</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Bibliographical Notes:**

<sup>1</sup> A. Miroiu, *Romanian education Today*, 1997, Ed. Polirom, Iasi, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem.*, p. 59-60.

<sup>4</sup> Adrian Neculau, The University: Its Values and actors, in the Vol. The Academic Fields and Its Actors.

<sup>5</sup> N. G. Niculescu, I. D. Adumitracesei, *Romanian Education at a Crossroads*, Ed. Polirom, Iasi, 1999, p. 73-80.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem.*, p. 80.

THÈSES DOCTORALES

**Gheorghe Clitan, RATIONALITY AND PRESUPPOSITION IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. The dispute between modernism and postmodernism, The University “Babeș-Bolyai” Cluj-Napoca, The History-Philosophy Department, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, Scientific Adviser: Prof. Constantin Grecu,**

**SUMMARY<sup>1</sup>**

The pragmatic turn in contemporary philosophy facilitates, together with the linguistic turn, the unorthodox approach (epistemology of beliefs and epistemic logic, theory of speech acts and illocutionary logic, theories and logic of presuppositions, a.s.o.) of certain domains that didn't preoccupy the traditional epistemology: cognitive implicit and discursive implicit. The theoretical addition brought by such interpretations is received either as a gain, or as a loss, being placed at the level of explicating the mentioned forms of implicit. It singles itself out by the *meta* charge of any type of approach and in furnishing of the adjacent discourse with a series of entities that bring – positively or negatively, in the shape of the various “phantoms” that haunt the actual philosophy – “Plato's beard” or “Occam's razor” back into discussion.

Among these entities the present study will concentrate especially on those related to the ontological presuppositions, that is, those coveted by acts belonging to reference's genre. The first definition given to presupposition (“that which must be true in order for a proposition to be true or false”) was semantic, linking it historically to the problem of existence. Therefore, when the specific literature approaches the presuppositional phenomenon it most often targets the existential

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<sup>1</sup> Translated by **Florin Lobonț**

presuppositions. Tacitly, and according to the spirit of semantics, it will be thought that the presupposition of existence is the prototype of any kind of presupposition. It was deemed as non-removable from whatever cognitive approach, being called, as a consequence, “the presupposition of presuppositions.”

This is connected either with its setting up as propositional attitude in the ontological discourse, or with its instantiation as referent for the term “existence” (or for other terms sinonom to it, e.g. “being”, “world”, “reality”, etc.), in other words with its functioning as a condition without which the discourse loses its legitimacy, and the referring relation is no longer possible. The placing of presuppositions among the propositional attitudes is the first step towards the pragmatic definition that has been subsequently given to it. According to the pragmatic interpretation, the existential presuppositions were attributed – as ontological engagements of the scientific approach or as setting up of propositional attitudes in scientific discourse – not to statements or theories, as semanticists deem, but to the knowing subject, and to scientific communities and research traditions.

The two ways of defining the existential presuppositions were extrapolated over whatever type of presupposition in the following manners:

- 1) semantically: presupposition is defined as the truth condition that makes a statement’s existence and normal functioning within discourse possible;
- 2) pragmatically, where presupposition is defined:
  - A) as a condition of “gratifying” an act of language, without which this is to be condemned to failure;
  - B) as a propriety of the subject S, or, to put it better, as a discourse act of the subject, or at least as a set up propositional attitude.

Apart from the existential presuppositions, an important role within scientific discourse is played by the so-called functional (methodological, lexical, a.s.o.) presuppositions. Among the methodological ones, the strategic presuppositions (that work as rules or regulating principles in the abductive inferences), the local (rules or defining, step-by-step, principles governing the deductive and inductive inferences), and the interrogative presuppositions (of the various types of questions) play a special role in the logic of scientific research (justifying and discovery) or in its contiguous theory of rationality.

Even the adepts of postmodernism who are the fiercest critics of metaphysical approach assumed by the presuppositional perspective, appreciate the pragmatic way of approaching the scientific

discourse when this discusses the role of pragmatic rules played by “metaprescriptors” (the name given by Lyotard to presuppositions). In the language game of science, metaprescriptors would account for the appearance and legitimisation of new ideas or statements because they show what the moves (statements) required by such a game should be in order to be accepted by the protagonists.

Besides producing the new, metaprescriptors can make the unveiling of the unknown, and the fulfilment of the wish for justice, possible, but only if they employ, within the game, a special procedure called “paralogy”: in other words, only if they stress upon discord and discovery’s unpredictability. Otherwise they go through aberrant genetic mutations, getting a bizarre behaviour and bringing the social culture or pragmatics in the position of a monster made up of a plurality of statement classes networks (denotative, prescriptive, performative, technical, evaluative, etc.) impossible to be interpreted in terms of diversity or language games locality.

In the same way it was conceived the functioning of the “indecidables” (to which Derrida refers) within the language game of culture. As facets of the semblance, or as false verbal, nominal, or semantic, proprieties, the indecidables elude any opposing (pair) of concepts of traditional metaphysics. Moreover, just like another postmodernist entity having a presuppositional status (called *différance*) they would disorganize metaphysical systems by destroying their subjacent hierarchies, disseminating their sense and making their establishing in terms of ultimate truth, or of metaphysics of presence, impossible.

The indecidables would assume their role within a discourse not from the speculative standpoint of a third term, but by interrogating the functioning possibilities of the other two as signs, that is, by questioning any kind of foundationalism (including that of a structuralist type to which the reference to sign tacitly sends). While metaprescriptions appear for postmodernists as clones, usually ill, of pragmatic presuppositions (being, and producing, cultural monsters) the indecidables were conceived as images in the negative of semantic presuppositions, the constructive role of the latter (conferring sense upon, and intelligibility to, statements) being replaced by deconstruction (uninterrupted dislocation, displacement and dissemination of sense).

However, the main desideratum regarding the usage of metaprescriptors and indecidables as cultural instruments is that of examining the conceptual oppositions within philosophical discourse pertaining to tradition. Its attainment would be the same with multiplying and disseminating conceptual oppositions within an indefinite cultural

game that lacks any centrality or normativity. For instance, the presupposition of difference is most often favoured within postmodernist ontology as an authentic mode of being (existential engagement, belief act, etc.) or as a condition of existence for the positive being(s) (that can be known through it, without it being apprehendable in them).

Edifying in the first case is exactly the way in which postmodernists present their own engagements, especially *difference* and *presence*. According to those inspired by Heidegger, difference – the central concept of “postmodern science” – is the irreconcilable conflict that resists any resolving grounded in the general rules of judgement. Thus understood, difference does belong neither to history, nor to some reasoning structure or norm. It consists in historicity – or rather presence – itself or its language game engaged in a perpetual authentication and renewal process.

In the second case, for the postmodernists inspired by Derrida, difference metamorphoses itself into *différance*, that is, in (temporal and special) postponement and (non-identitary) difference, being that which in present's presence never presents itself. In each of the two hypostases, difference appears as a presupposition whose status constantly and unpredictably slides between existential and methodological, entailing, within the game, a train of contradictory significances through which the dislocation, upsetting and displacement of conceptual oppositions within the language of whatever metaphysics, is attempted.

As it can be easily noticed, the formal scheme of postmodern understanding of presuppositions duplicates that offered by pragmatics when their functioning mechanism within the language games of culture (science, arts, religion, etc.) is explained. When the aim consists in deconstructing the metaphysical systems, we will show that the model of their functioning within discourse is a slightly modified replica of that advanced from the standpoints of pragmatism, hermeneutics and analytical philosophy.

The main objection raised, from the postmodernist view, to the pragmatic approach of presuppositions regards its attempt to establish the metaprescriptive rules common to all language games. Thus, traditional pragmatics of science wouldn't escape the syndrome of totality and totalitarianism, but would keep it in a smouldering state. Although not always directly, pragmatics is also blamed – along with hermeneutics –, for instead of retrieving the subjectivity of the autonomous (or sovereign) *individual existences* it should deal with the *existence* (or being) per se.

Taking the main modalities of presuppositional (semantic and pragmatic) grounding of contemporary scientific approach into discussion the present study refers to the postmodernist criticism and challenges addressed to traditional philosophy. It approaches the problems announced in the title from a triple perspective: epistemological (theory of rationality and epistemology of beliefs), logic (epistemic logic, illocutionary logic and logic of presuppositions), and pragmatic (relevance theory, speech acts theory and theory of presuppositions).

The assumed framework is a metaphilosophical one, rooted in pragmatism and analytical philosophy. Its main ideas can be outlined as follows:

- 1) The status of scientific knowledge has undergone substantial changes in our day in the sense that it encompasses metadiscursively the cognitive implicit, which has determined its perceiving from a perspective different from the traditional one: from the mere systematic gathering of information (however specific the manner of its acquiring and communication), the scientific knowledge becomes a game of significances and speech acts grounded both on public explicit rules, and personal implicit norms;
- 2) The contemporary scientific knowledge has engulfed new domains, some derived from its own ways of theorising and communication: this has imposed a shift of interest from informativity to performativity, from the scientific towards the metascientific and from the philosophical towards the metaphilosophical etc., apparently at the expense of traditional disciplines and practice, but rejected irrevocably from postmodernism's point of view;
- 3) In our day scientific knowledge is not any longer reduced only to its standardised aspect, which is often overbid by the scientists' community (the strong rationality), but allows numerous attempts aiming at its "softening" (weak rationality), rationality's weakening – just like the favouring of its "strong" form – being also the object of other approaching standpoints than the postmodernist one, among which the meta-epistemological and post-epistemological perspectives proved themselves very fertile;
- 4) The present-day epistemology has assumed the two perspectives (namely *meta* and *post*) against the background of an increasingly visible theoretical move from the conceptual towards the actional, leading, as a result, to the relativisation of the approach of knowledge (and that of the scientific approach,

respectively) until its complete dissolving into other cultural practices;

- 5) Nowadays the extremes to which epistemological relativism was pushed touch the limit-versions of cultural relativism: anarcho-rationalism, as modernist hypostasis of epistemological relativism (point of view tolerance, ratiocination disciplining, historicism, a.s.o) and post-rationalism as modernist hypostasis of the same type of relativism (mythological, paralogical, deconstructionist, a.s.o.).

I think that, for the time being, the mere sketch of such a framework justifies the approach of one of the interrogations that have marked the present culture (postmodernism or ultramodernism?) in the shape of a disjunctive non-exclusive relation. In order to attain such an aim the present study will undertake a case study (the cultural engagement through speech acts) of the problems enounced in the title (rationality and presupposition in scientific knowledge). Strictly epistemologically speaking, the study will aim at identifying the modes of *setting up* – in the shape of ontological engagement – of the existential presuppositions within scientific discourse (thus of the latter's impliciting through presuppositions) and their *instantiation* as "rationalised implicit" at the level of theory (that is, the metadiscursive explication of presuppositions or engagements at issue).

From the perspective, deliberately accepted, of non-formal analysis, I also had other ways of approaching the relation between rationality and presupposition to be subsumed to the question "postmodernism or ultramodernism?" For quite a while I was tempted by two of them, namely by the realisation of a double monograph (of rationality and presupposition), and the investigation of the way in which the relation rationality-presupposition has manifested itself during history of science (or within a certain period or problem of this history).

In the end I gave up both, for the path thus taken would have been one already well trodden and marked out (through books, problems, and authors), and especially updated and dealt with in Romanian literature, either through original works, or through translations. I have preferred a novel approach – liable to be turned into an unwonted one – especially because a systematic study able to offer the "post-philosophical" image of a way of rationality's, and presupposition's, manifestation (setting up and instantiation) within the scientific discourse, hasn't been yet undertaken in Romania.

Another reason in favour of the chosen approach was the wish to offer points of view less circulated in the Romanian epistemological literature (epistemology of beliefs, epistemic logic, theory and logic of

presuppositions, theory of speech acts and illocutionary logic). For the same reason the background against which the entire approach of this study is pursued has been drawn around the cultural dispute between modernism and postmodernism, with an accent laid on the relation between traditional philosophy and post-philosophy regarding rationality.

In order to stand out the presuppositions of postmodernism and their manifestations within postphilosophy, the premises of postmodernist spirit that can be identified in contemporary philosophy (phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, Marxism, structuralism, pragmatism, analytical philosophy) as well as certain problems that posed challenges to postmodernism (scientific knowledge, the cultural real, media, education, the pluralism of life forms) are reviewed.

The cultural image is that of the 'disenchantment of the world', recoverable within contemporary philosophy from at least two directions: the postmetaphysical and the postphilosophical. The study shows how the passing from the paradigm of substantial (material, ontological) rationality to that of procedural (formal, epistemological) rationality under the banner of postmetaphysical thought, was made, and that this phenomenon has led to the confinement of the concept of rationality from the domain of the entire being to the human approach (thinking, action, practice) and its artefacts.

Thus, a first disenchantment (theological, philosophical and scientific) of the world is supposed to have taken place, followed by a panlogicisation of thought and human enterprises, doctrinary emphasisable in hermeneutics, existentialism, Marxism, structuralism, pragmatism, analytical philosophy) in the shape of philosophical critics, metaphilosophy, and postphilosophy. The second (culturological) disenchantment is linked to the relativist perspective of postphilosophical thought – announced by the so-called "policecentric" and "pragmatic," cultures – targeting especially reason (knowing subject's consciousness) and behaviour (linguistic and cognitive acts, etc.).

From the methodological point of view, the main effect of the two ways of disenchanting was:

1) for the modernist approaches:

A) a strong panrationalisation (archi-rationalism);

B) a weak rationalisation (anarco-rationalism);

2) for the postmodernist approaches :

A) a demolishing attitude towards tradition (revolutionary, critical-subversive, postmodernism);

B) a re-enchantment of the world through the pluralist turning to good account of tradition (reactionary, neoclassical, postmodernism).

The conclusion arrived at is that, though the fact that it claims to realise the “overcoming”, or “destruction”, or “death”, of philosophy, nevertheless the postphilosophical, including the postmodern, thought, remains (with respect to the attainment of the aim of deconstruction, parody, etc.) Kantian – Max-Weberian in character (promoted nowadays) consisting in:

- 1) The establishment and achievement of a goal;
- 2) The choosing and employing of the means appropriate to the attainment of the goal;
- 3) The operationalisation of the rationality standard (criteria, order, rule, norm, etc).

No doubt, within such an interpretation the risk of projecting, in a modernist manner, of a rationalising filter over postmodernism, appears; but the taking of such a chance by the author of these lines is related to the analysis he’s going to make to the so-called “postmodern” challenges and presuppositions.

My claim is that the reviewed postmodernist challenges and presuppositions are, in one way or other, quite close to the modernist critical spirit, too. The modernist critique of rationality doesn’t seem to be alien to such challenges but realizes its conceptual dislocations within a special metatheoretical frame (rational decision, justification procedure, falsifiability, etc.). Postmodernist challenges, in their turn, seem to have expanded themselves from the relations between the domains pertaining to culture and knowledge to day-by-day problems of the individual, gravitating mostly around the individual’s relations with various totalizing instantiations of human spirituality (logocentrism, the metanarrative, the ideological, the power, etc.).

This claim will be turned into a logistic support for the offered analyses and solutions in the second part of the study. Briefly described, the support in question is the following: the changes brought about by the postmodernist challenges rather radicalize the value systems than the form or the content of knowledge; for this reason the tendency to consider them paradigmatic is questionable. Departing from such considerations, my study discusses the actual changes within the status of scientific knowledge, returning as many times as necessary to such challenges and to the way they are received by contemporary philosophy.

The analysis of the modernist attempts to overcome, epistemologically, the limits traditionally established through distinctions of the sort knowledge with a subject-knowledge without a subject, strong rationality-weak rationality, context of justification-context of discovery, knowledge-belief, etc., will lead to the remark that terminological

renovations haven't always entailed conceptual renovations, the conceptual – and especially the presuppositional – framework remaining often unchanged. Examples of this fact are given throughout the analysis of the problems brought about by the terms knowledge–epistemological belief, my conclusion being that the contemporary epistemological discussions cannot ignore the various ways in which the scientific discourse rationalises the explicit and implicit aspects of knowledge.

A great deal of attention is paid to the manners of rationalisation of the cognitive implicit, through distinguishing between rationalisation (as act and process, especially discursive), and rationality (as outcome and metadiscursive object of study). Thus a large room for distinctions having a pragmatic charge (truth-plausibility, justification-acceptation, objectivity-solidarity) is being made; their imposing within the epistemological discourse isn't alien to the meaning ascribed by the Peircean pragmatism to rationalisation and rationality. Rationalisation seems to consist in the behavioural ability to set up and instantiate epistemic beliefs; rationality seems to be its conceptual significance, more exactly its practical relevance imaginable for the conduct of scientific, cultural, daily, etc., life.

By vulgarising this type of pragmatism (associated with the axis James-Dewey-Schiller-Rorty) by some promoters of postphilosophy epistemic rationalisation has been replaced by rhetoric argumentation; scientific rationality by behavioural reasonability; and critical thinking of the scientist by ordinary man's desiderative thinking. At the conceptual level this led to an illicit transfer of significance from the scientific to the cultural, from the terminology of natural science to that of social sciences, from the rigour of the philosophical expression to the literary verbiage, etc.

I deem that the result was in many cases an unwarranted rhetoricism (the "overcoming" and "transforming" of philosophy, especially metaphysics, epistemology and anthropology) and an eschatological one (the "end" of philosophy, the "demise" of art and the "death" of man) which, when applied to scientific discourse, has led to numerous cases of intellectual imposture (see, for instance, the Sokal "affair"). Within such a context the pragmatic approach of the rationality problems made itself up as a modernist counterweight to the postmodernist exaggerations, even when its promoters haven't directly referred to postmodernism.

Such an approach offers me a research perspective on the problem of softening or weakening of scientific rationality. This explains why I insist upon the role played, within scientific discourse, by the presence of

phenomena such as relevance and presupposition and speak even of a presuppositional moulding of scientific rationality. Actually the whole approach takes place by assuming as implicit that the standpoints – already classical – characterising the approach of the problems of rationality, catch only a part of the problems implied by the explication of the tacit in science, namely that of the informational content of theories (*semantic explicit*).

The methodological consequence will be that the standpoints that led to the overthrowing of the classical image of science will be approached only selectively, the analysis being instead directed to views that trifle with postphilosophy and pragmatics, owing to the fact that they have imposed a different type of explicit (the *pragmatic explicit*). The novelty of this approach consists in the distinction between the two forms of explication (semantic and pragmatic) of the factors (internal and external) that intervene into the scientific pursuit according to the manner they were set up (or implied) within that discourse.

Moreover, starting from the traditional distinction between rationalisation and rationality the discussion approaches:

- 1) with respect to rationalisation: on the one hand, the rationalisation of the first type of implicit – the semantic – *in actu* (in the shape of informational content) and *of the act at issue* (by the encapsulation of this implicit by the illocutionary force) and, on the other hand, the rationalisation, *through act* – as pragmatic implicit – of the very informational content and illocutionary force (subjected to rationalisation), that is, of the implicit already explicated, according to an epistemically discursive (conceptual, propositional, inferential, a.s.o.) attitude;
- 2) with respect to rationality: on the one hand, about the distinction between explicit rationality (as outcome of rationalisation *in actu* and *of the act*) and implicit rationality (as effect of rationalisation *through act*) and, on the other hand, about the overlapping, within a certain context, of rationality and relevance, and relevance and metarationality of knowledge.

The pragmatic perspective over rationality, thus outlined, was further developed into a similar analysis of presuppositions. The resulted discussion dwells upon:

- 1) Presupposition as main form of manifestation (together with the implicature) of the discursive implicit, and the manner it can intervene in scientific knowledge and its philosophical approach;
- 2) The existential presuppositions as modalities of ontological engagement of scientific discourse of science and philosophy;

3) The presuppositional ingredients of scientific discourse (axioms, hypotheses, laws, principles, a.s.o.) and the main mechanisms of setting up (“cumulative hypotheses,” “compositionality,” “acceptability,” etc.), respectively instantiation (“projection,” “rejection,” “cancelling”) of presuppositions within the discourse.

The study proposes a mode of approach of scientific knowledge and rationality from the combined perspective of Gettier and of the epistemological interpretation of presuppositions. In developing it, I first investigate the present status possessed by a series of epistemological terms such as *knowledge*, *belief*, *interpretation*, *relevance*, *rationality*, and only subsequently the significance these confer upon the presuppositional terms (*supposition*, *presupposition*, *implication*, *language act*, etc.) is analysed.

The study analyses the non-standard interpretation (of the epistemic logic’s type) of the cognitive act, aiming at showing that the model of rationality that made it possible is also tacitly admitted – as metarational project – by approaches that reject it or claim they ignore it (postmodernist deconstructivism, postphilosophical epistemology, methodological anarchism, etc.). According to the non-standard interpretation of the cognitive act, this can take many forms, among which only three will be found in the present study, due to the fact that they have gained a place within the dispute modernism-postmodernism. In the specialised literature they are expressed with the help of certain epistemic verbs (“to know”, “to believe”, and “to believe religiously”).

By embracing the special formalism of epistemic logic –  $Ks(p)$ = the subject (researcher, scientist, etc.)  $S$  knows that  $p$ ,  $Bs(p)$ =subject  $S$  opines or simply believes that  $p$  and  $Fs(p)$ = the subject  $S$  religiously believes that  $p$  – their formal structure is expressed as follows:

For  $Ks(p)$ :

$[p] = T$  ( $p$  is true =  $p$ ’s veryfunctionality);

$A(p)$  ( $p$ ’s acceptability or admissibility);

$J(p)$  ( $p$ ’s justifiability);

For  $Bs(p)$ :

$[p] = TvF$  ( $p$  is true or false =  $p$ ’s realisability);

$A(p)$  ( $p$ ’s acceptability, or admissibility, etc.);

$J(p)$  ( $p$ ’s justifiability);

For  $Fs(p)$ :

$[p] = Tb$  ( $p$  is biblically true, or, in other words,  $p$ ’s Biblical truth);

$A(p)$  ( $p$ ’s acceptability, admissibility, opinability, etc.);

$Jb(p)$  ( $p$ 's Biblical justifiability).

My judgment is that if, traditionally, the analysis of a term such as  $Fs(p)$  seemed somehow out of its place within an epistemological context (ignoring the fact that there is even an *epistemology* of religious belief) only the enumeration of the existence conditions of the belief act designated by this term shows that such an opinion is hardly sustainable. From strictly formal point of view this act has a structure similar to that of knowledge acts and not to those of opinion or non-religious belief, as linguistically the terms designating it imply. It's only that they differ by the type of truth and justification they utter: epistemological (in case of  $Ks(p)$ ) or biblical (in case of  $Fs(p)$ ).

Starting from the logical-epistemic structure of cognitive acts and attempting to summarize the important epistemological standpoints, the study argues that the  $R$  rationality aims at, in a strictly traditional manner – for the knowledge acts  $Ks$  – the relation between  $p$ 's justification and  $p$ 's truth value (propositional or informational content). However, it is easy to notice that the traditional definition – as relation between  $T(p)$  ( $p$ 's truth) and  $J(p)$  ( $p$ 's justification) of rationality – can be found in the structure of all cognitive acts of the  $K(s)$ ,  $B(s)$ , and  $F(s)$  type.

The study also makes a remark on the Platonician definition of  $Ks$ , namely that Gettier's challenge has drawn the attention on two relations ignored from the perspective of tradition (between  $Bs$  and  $[p]$ , between  $Bs$  and  $Jp$ ); this challenge is based on the following two reasons:

- 1)  $p$ 's value cannot be solely the truth (it can be false, probable, or others :  $[p] = T \vee F \vee Pr \vee \dots$ ) but even of a different nature than truth and falsehood (satisfaction, success, a.s.o.);
- 2) the rationality of the cognitive act cannot be any longer understood only as relating between  $[p]$  and  $J(p)$ , but rather between  $[p]$  and  $A(p)$ ;

$J(p)$ 's place (available evidence, logical grounding, etc.) can be taken by elements that work as metarational standards (criticability, failibility, presupposability, a.s.o).

In the end, the most important remark on the the traditional manner (standard and non-standard) of defining the cognitive acts covets the formal characteristics of the three acts. Their formal structure was exploited in the sense of 'enlarging' the concept of rationality from *strong rationality* to *weak rationality* and 'restricting' the concept of *irrationality* (when it is allowed) only to phenomena pertaining to pathology (schizophrenia, paranoia, etc.) and not to phenomena that fall under the influence of external factors (social, economic, cultural, psychological, a.s.o.).

As a consequence, rationality appears to be thought about as a relating of factors that belong to the psycho-socio-logical context. As a result, rationality is thought of as relating between factors pertaining to the psycho-socio-logical context (called “external”) and empirical-logical (called “internal”), the traditional way of considering rationality (seen only as relating of internal factors – deemed the only “rational” factors) being thus overcome. In the former case, the main criteria of establishing the rationality of cognitive approach is the possibility of justifying  $p$  ( $p$ 's justifiability), and not the possibility of  $p$ 's truth value ( $p$ 's realisability). In the latter case, the criterion is “weakened,” and regards the explication of choosing  $p$  ( $p$ 's credibility, preference for  $p$ ,  $p$ 's relevance, a.s.o.).

The conclusion reached with respect to this problem is that the weakening of the rationality criterion has led to the acceptance of a minimal rationality which permits the qualification as *rational* also for acts such as opinion or non-religious belief, which made rationalists talk currently nowadays about rational opinions or beliefs. Another conclusion refers to the fact that classical analysis of the concept of knowledge equates rationality with the act of rationalization, and sees rationalization at the most as a relating between  $p$ 's truth and  $p$ 's justification – if it doesn't reduce it to  $J(p)$  –, and this relation will be called “explicit rationality.” Moreover, the attempts to bring about counterexamples to Gettier's problem (Chisholm, Lehrer, Klein, etc.) do not exit the framework of traditional analysis, for they only enforce the justification condition and suggest the replacement or equating of  $T(p)$  with  $Ks(p)$ . The immediate consequence will be the dwelling in the area of the same explicit rationality understood metadiscursively at the most as a relating between  $Ks(p)$  and  $Bs(p)$ .

Shifting the accent on the epistemic attitudes of the  $Bs(p)$  type and interpreting them not only as expressions of  $S'$  behaviour, but also of the acts done by the researcher in order to obtain and communicate information, the author of the present study believes in the possibility of approaching the cognitive implicit and rationality that surround it in terms of relevance, calling such a rationality “implicit rationality”.

One particular departure point of his claim is the epistemological defining of relevance as affectation relation from a  $x$  factor or  $p$  propriety towards a phenomenon in its occurrence, a subject in its qualification, in a word, a problem  $c$  in its solving. Another departure point is the hypothesis that the affectation points, by virtue of its denomination, at the psycho-socio-logical component of cognitive activity, whereas a problem's solving relation entails, by virtue of its content, the logical-empirical component of discourse. The third departure point is the

interpretation of cognitive activity not only as a ready established discourse but as a “setting *in actu*” of such a discourse and as relating of all acts through which it is set up and works *qua* problems raising.

The flow of demonstration advances based on the idea that thinking of rationality as relating of factors pertaining to psycho-socio-logical context (the external ones) with empirical-logical factors (the internal) is marked in language by the two defining aspects of a language act – illocutionary force or value and propositional content – that by mutually affecting each other and co-relating with one another bears on a particular type of rationalisation (*within*, *through*, and *of*, discourse acts) and of (*implicit* and *explicit*) rationality, respectively. According to the same idea, the application of language acts’ terminology (“informational”, or “propositional, content”, “illocutionary value” or “force”, “language”, or “discourse, act” a.s.o.) to scientific discourse turns this terminology if not into the expression then at least into the bearer of some categories of factors (‘inter’ – and ‘intra’ – scientific, that is, *internal*; ‘extra’-scientific, that is *external*) related by implying or presupposing in the shape of relevance or/and rationality within knowledge.

According to the expectations of this kind overlapped onto the suggestions given by the Austinian speech acts trichotomy, relevance appears as threefold ‘dovetailing’:

- 1) of contents among themselves, of values or forces among themselves (rationalization *in actu*);
- 2) of contents with values or forces (rationalization *through* act);
- 3) of relation(ing)s thus obtained with the various acts (rationalization *of* act).

In all cases, if dovetailing is *implied* then relevance leads to the so-called “explicit” (propositional) rationality; if it is *presupposed*, then it leads to an “implicit” (or tacit) rationality. Thus what appears as relevant within a language act, no matter whether it is cognitive *per se* or merely drawn into cognition, refers to this double relating – through implication and presupposition – in the shape of “inter”-, “intra”-, and “extra”- affection, understood as dovetailing.

The solution is in harmony with the pragmatic spirit of postphilosophy and thus becomes the target for the fire of a few traditional, “modernist”, questions. First: is such an interpretation valid for any type of rationality? If so, then which is, for instance, the distinction between the scientific and philosophic, rationalities? Second: How can the two components of scientific discourse be overlapped onto the two components (one each) of the double context of cognitive activity’s proceeding?

The answer given in my study – without aiming at subscribing to the exaggerations of any of the aforesaid views (“modern” or “postmodern”) – draws the identity mark between relevance and rationality. This is based on the suggestion coming from the defining of rationality in relation(al) terms capable of prefiguring a model or a concept of integrating rationality. Within this view, and according to the etymology of the verb *to point out* (as relevant) in the above answer relevance is associated at least with two situations which define the same number of states of rationality (usually indistinctively depicted in the literature dealing with the problem).

First: “with drawing the attention on” the factor, property, or problem in question, that is, with bringing it into light, in a word, its identification, or establishing (operational-instrumental, determinative *per se*, rationality). Then: with the factor’s, property’s, or problem’s, “dovetailing” or “non-dovetailing” to the phenomenon, subject or other problem to which they are related (signifying-semiological or interpretive-comprehensive, rationality). With respect to dovetailing it is said that what is relevant is the situation – the factor, property, or problem determining/sending to, *what* it is (often, improperly put, determinative, not explicative, rationality) and explaining/showing *how* it is (explicative rationality *par excellence*), its co-related.

According to such an answer rationality acquires two manifesting facets: *explicit rationality* (as relationing, under *Ks*, of *[p]* with *Ap* and *Jp*) and *implicit rationality* (as metadiscursive relationing between *Ks*, *Ap*, *Js* on the one hand, and *Bs*, *Fs*, etc., on the other). Notably, within these relations, *Ks*, *Ap*, and *Js*, pass for internal factors, whereas *Bs*, *Fs* and other elements of this kind pass for external factors. The former relationing pertains to the epistemic level of the approach (that of scientific theory), and the latter to its epistemological level (of metatheory).

Given that relations are established through certain complex speech acts (expressing the various cognitive acts and the relations between them: *Ks*, *Bs*, *Fs*, *A(p)*, *J(p)*, a.s.o.), we can talk about a rationality of speech acts that comprises both facets of scientific approach’s rationality. Yet, as knowledge in general doesn’t coincide with scientific knowledge, often beliefs (for example *Bs* and *Fs*) involved into the cognitive pursuit add to, or substitute themselves – through speech acts – for the knowledge *Ks* obtained through scientific practice.

Some contemporary epistemological views – such as fallibilism – detaches themselves explicitly from such a viewpoint when eliminate *Jp* from the formal structure of knowledge acts, although they tacitly admit the assumption of rationality for *Bs* or *Fs*. Thus they only perpetuate the

spirit of tradition, according to which the rational elements within justification come at odds (under certain aspects) with the non-rational, or even irrational, nature of belief. Other views – for instance the so-called “moderate”, “ponderate”, or “weak,” rationalism – propose the enlargement or loosening of rationality through relating *Ks* with elements (*Bs*, *Fs*, etc.) other than those traditionally deemed rational (*Tp*, *Ap*, *Jp*).

Owing to this perspective the attempts at developing the traditional view add to the relation between *Jp* and [*p*] the Gettian one, between *Bs* and *Jp*. Thus, a new metadiscursive concept of rationality  $R=\{Ks, Bs\}$  that impose the taking into account of discursive implicit, was arrived at. Though, it is thought that not only the implication is able to strain false ideas,  $\neg p$ , into the discursive content, but – owing to  $A(p)$  – the explication as well. How is such a situation possible?

First, due to the fact that  $A(p)$  is an act pertaining to *S*, its value depending on the intentions, opinions, beliefs, etc., of *S* rather than to the truth of *p*. Secondly, because those that are responsible for the straining of *S*' intentions, opinions, etc., into the discourse are the relations of implication and explication mentioned above. Thirdly, this is so because the body of knowledge presumably includes, besides the *Ks* system of propositions that transmit information about reality, the system *Bs* of beliefs that express person *S*' discursive attitude.

From this perspective, the traditional concept of knowledge *Ks* will be replaced – as a consequence of Gettier's challenge – with that of metaknowledge:  $MKs = \{Ks, Bs\}$ . It is notable that what for the traditional attempts to bring counterexamples to Gettier's problem represented the metadiscursive rationality *R*, for the new approaches represented only *MKs*. This shows that traditional epistemology, despite all its attempts at modernisation, couldn't escape from the presuppositional carcasse of the strong rationality model. The break through this carcasse took place in close connection with the interdisciplinary development of scientific knowledge, epistemologically reflected by the introduction of the metarationality concept instead of that of rationality, and by the replacement of the classical notions of model and system with those of metamodel and metasystem, as well as by other phenomena of this kind.

In order to explain the phenomenon I resorted to the standpoint saying that a researcher *S* can have three attitudes *vis-à-vis* the statements or propositions he realizes in the discursive act of knowledge :

- 1) to believe that *p* or to accept (that) *p*; in a word, *Bp*;
- 2) not to believe that *p* or to reject *p*; in a word, *Rp*;

3) to suspend, or to refrain from making, the judgment about  $p$ ; in a word,  $Sp$ .

The last two attitudes were defined in the literature developed around this standpoint with the help of  $Bs(p)$  – simply  $B$  – and negation operator ( $R_s(p)=B\neg p$ ;  $S_s(p)=\neg Bp\&\neg B\neg p$ ), being associated to the concepts of impossibility and contingency of modal logic whereas belief was defined in the traditional epistemological manner and associated to necessity, like presupposition.

The same specialized literature shows that the setting up of the aforesaid attitudes within cognitive discourse is limited by the requirement of  $p$ 's consistency with the other propositions pertaining to the body of  $S$ 's knowledge in the sense that  $S$  can embrace, at a given moment, only one of the three attitudes towards  $p$ . Within the sphere of a discourse act's content explicit inconsistency can be manifest only between  $p$  and the other propositions of the cognitive system that negates  $p$ : it is impossible for  $S$  to believe (or accept, or admit)  $p$  and  $\neg p$  at the same time, that is, it is impossible  $Bs$  and  $R_s$  at the same time. In act's form, explicit inconsistency doesn't appear between  $Bs$  and  $R_s$  but between  $Bs$  and  $S_s$ , for  $Bs$  and  $R_s$  express, qua form, the same act – of "credit" – but having different contents ( $p$  and  $\neg p$ ).

Within the concept of metarationality such phenomena can be found either as  $R = \{Ks, Bs\}$  in case of the discursive content of the knowledge act and as strong rationality, or as  $MR = \{Ks, Bs, Rs\}$  in case of the act's form and as loose rationality. How can the placing under the same rationality concept ( $R$  or  $MR$ ) of seemingly contradictory propositional states ( $p$  and  $\neg p$ ) or of discursive acts ( $Ks, Bs, Rs$ ), be explained? My study answers to this question in the following way: by supplementing the conditions of existence of  $Bs(p)$  – popperian conceived, a)  $[p] = T \vee F(p)$  (true or false =  $p$ 's realisability); b)  $A(p)$  ( $p$ 's acceptability, or admissibility); c) -----) with that of *presupponibility* (one's capacity to engage oneself tacitly into a given relation on the ground of presuppositions, noted with  $P(p)$ ) which is responsible for the admission of  $p$  and  $\neg p$  into  $Bs$  as well as of  $P(p)$ 's turning into (substitution for)  $Bs$ , and of  $Bs$  into (for)  $Ks$ , etc.

Presupponibility is arguably responsible for the admission of  $p$  and  $\neg p$  in  $Bs$ , as well as for  $P(p)$ 's changing (substitution) into (by)  $Bs$ , of  $Bs$  into (by)  $Ks$ , etc. According to this interpretation, the popperian model of  $Bs$  – from which the c) condition, differentiating formally  $Ks$  from  $Bs$ , was absent – becomes the following:

- 1)  $[p] = T \vee F$  ( $p$ 's realisability);
- 2)  $A(p)$  ( $p$ 's acceptability or admissibility);

### 3) $P(p)$ ( $p$ 's presupponibility).

Instead of  $P(p)$ , certain models have proposed other conditions for  $p$ 's admission or truth value (critique, reliability, fallibility, etc.), of which only reliability proved satisfactory for the explanation of  $S'$  possibility to tacitly admit  $p$  and  $\neg p$  (though only by resorting to external factors).

Presupponibility would allow the explanation of co-existence situations of  $p$  and  $\neg p$  within discourse without entailing resort to external factors. It regards two types of relations of  $p$  with the system of propositions designated by the knowledge concept,  $Ks$ : the relation of *presupposing* and the relation of *presuppositioning*. These relations represent the main ways of setting up of presuppositions within discourse, but only the former benefited by interpretations within the specialised literature. Logically-linguistically, they were "moulded" in the shape of certain semantic and pragmatic mechanisms of multiplication of presuppositions within the discourse (*cumulative hypotheses mechanisms, compositionality, acceptabilities, projection, or heritage*) and of their limitation (*projection, rejection, cancellation, or erasing, mechanisms*).

The aim of this approach is to propose the understanding of presuppositional factors as mainly responsible for the implicating and explicating of cognitive discourse. The backing is made by taking into discussion not only the presupposing relation (prevalently deductive and explicative), as it happens most often in the specialised literature, but also the presuppositioning relation (prevalently inductive or abductive and implicative) distinguishing the relations at issue from the presuppositions per se.

In its turn, scientific theory is interpreted as a modality of conceptual (intensional and extensional) organising of the internal and external factors that affect science in the shape of certain inferential relations of a special type: *implication* (or *entailment*) and *presupposing*. I interpret these relations as ways of disclosing the various ways of discursive explication of the aforesaid factors, to which I add the ones implicating them (relations of *implicationing* and *presuppositioning*).

Regarding *explication* and *implication*, they are interpreted as acts of epistemological commitment of scientists, no matter whether theorists or practitioners. They appear to be the ways in which the problems of the aforesaid factors "enter" *in* (are explicated) or/and "exits" *from* (are implicated), the attention of the scientific researchers. Thus, they are interpreted as represented components of a special type of knowledge (*discursive knowledge*, or knowledge *through language*) upon which, the factors at issue confer, metadiscursively, particular forms of rationality

(*explicit* or *tacit*) and different types of logical “behaviour” (*deductive*, *inductive*, *abductive*).

In short, the above situations can be described as follows:

- 1) Implication and presupposition do not mix up with the double relations – explicative and implicative – which each express metadiscursively: the relations of “implication” and “presupposing” (for explication) on the one hand, and the relations of “implicationing” and “presuppositioning” (for implication), on the other;
- 2) Implication and presupposition represent the final meeting or departure points – practically the metadiscursive crossing points (progression and/or regression) – of the aforesaid relations;
- 3) Implication and presupposition intervene into discourse – as modes of logical-linguistic rationalisation of epistemological relations of deductive-explicative type (implication) and inductive-implicatory (presupposition) – in the shape of intellectual engagements based on which we talk about explicit and implicit rationality.

Starting from the problem raised by the logical-linguistic study of presuppositions (the limits of semantic and pragmatic definitions, mechanisms of setting up and instantiation within discourse, computer pattern-making, their functioning as non-intended models in any approach a.s.o.), the study proposes their subjection to an epistemological approach. According to this approach, philosophical presuppositions, even though tacit in character, are not indistinct from axioms, postulates, principles or premises of an approach, but offer the latter a manifestation framework and are called, in philosophy of science, “background assumptions.”

Until not long ago it has been considered that by being invisible they escaped the control of experience and posed serious instrumental problems to logic and computer simulation. Nevertheless lately numerous attempts of logical-linguistic formalisation of presuppositions are being recorded and their computer simulation has become not only a theoretical “target” but one of practical interest too: military (being coveted by programmes ordered by various military organisations and organisms), technologically (forming a direction constantly followed by the big computer manufacturers), or of another applicative nature.

From these perspectives presupposing is understood as an epistemological relation through which – starting from a series of metadiscursive ingredients of language (suppositions, hypotheses, principles, laws, etc) – an identification of the intellectual engagements of principle type named presuppositions is attempted, but without

considering it as indistinct from these presuppositions, just as it isn't indistinct from the implicative relation of presuppositionalising. The latter is "responsible" for the assimilation or internalisation by a theory of external, irrational, factors discussed about by theory of rationality – but only those deemed relevant – into structural, internal, factors.

In its turn, presupposition grounds epistemologically the truth of propositions and negations about these factors (this being a reason why in logic it is understood as double necessary implication) as well as the correctness of questions and the grounding of answers about them, not to mention a whole series of strictly discursive phenomena. Implication, or more correctly, entailment only relates the internal factors among themselves in such a way that starting from certain characteristics of some of them the characteristics of the others will be identified; and based on similarities and regularities the principles and laws by virtue of which they got such characteristics will be formulated.

Thus defined – and read *If p, then q* – the relation of implication is rather associated with the epistemological operation of explanation or with the non-logical operation of causality than with the logical operation of implication. In a logical sense, implication – noted  $p \rightarrow q$  – ensures the truth of a proposition from the truth of another making it clear that thus defined it moulds an inferential relation.

Logically-linguistically the defining of presupposition has been realised by reference to the two basic forms of implication: either the "strong" one (*formal* implication) or the "weak" one (*material* implication). Yet at this point only the definition formulated in terms of modalities' theory will be retained namely  $(p \rightarrow q)$ :  $\Box(p \Rightarrow q)$  &  $\Box(\neg p \Rightarrow q)$ , implying that the acceptance (allowance, believing, etc.) of  $q$  admits both  $[p]=T$ , as well as  $[p]=F$ . Departing from the mere stating of this definition and correlating it to the formal structure of a belief act  $Bs$  or to the mechanism of discursive setting up of this act, the study asserts that the presupposition ( $q$  in this case) explains not only the setting up – under the auspices of "good reasons" – of false beliefs, opinions, or ideas, into discourse, but also the substitution of acts of belief or rational opinion for knowledge acts per se.

In order to understand the discursive phenomenon of acceptance (allowance, believing, etc.) – as presuppositions – of false ideas, but especially in order to grasp more clearly the difference between the relation of presupposing and that of entailment, I offer the truth tables of the two relations, all the more so as in the specialised literature these tables are made by reference to those that currently define implication:

Presupposition	Implication
$p \rightarrow q$	$p \Rightarrow q$
$T \rightarrow T$	$T \Rightarrow T$
$\neg(T \vee F) \leftarrow F$	$F \Leftarrow F$
$F \rightarrow T$	$F \Rightarrow (T \vee F)$

The thesis also argues that the best known logical definition given so far to presupposition is Fregean in character (it is connected to the theory of sense and signification in Frege) and states that “a proposition  $p$  logically presupposes a proposition  $q$  if and only if for any possible circumstance  $w$ , when  $p$  is true or false within  $w$ , then  $q$  is true within  $w$ .” The study also considers that a procedure equivalent to this defining mode that leads to the nuancing of the above definition in terms of semantic theory, is expressed by the sentence “a proposition  $p$  logically presupposes a proposition  $q$  if and only if, for any possible circumstance  $w$ , when  $q$  is non-true,  $p$  is neither true, nor false within  $w$ .”

Further, the interpretation of the above definitions in the language of models theory, is linked to the so-called defining of proposition *via* negation: “a proposition  $\varphi$  logically presupposes a proposition  $\psi$  if and only if  $\varphi \neq \psi$  and  $\neg\varphi \neq \psi$ . The change of language led to wordings of the following type:

- 1) “if  $\psi$  is a propositional non-tautological expression and if  $\varphi$  logically presupposes  $\psi$  then there must be situations (models) in which  $\varphi$  is neither true, nor false”;
- 2) “if  $\varphi$  ceases to be true within a model, let’s say  $M$ , then we’ll have  $M \vDash \varphi$   $\wedge$   $M \vDash \neg\varphi$ ”.

The study assumes the standpoint – widespread within the specialised literature – according to which the previous definitions illustrate the impossibility to build logic of presuppositions as a classical logic. According to them, logical presuppositions survive to negation (the specialised literature talks about a negation test of identifying presuppositions within discourse), which is a kind of saying that “if  $\varphi$  logically presupposes  $\psi$ , then the negation of  $\varphi$  also logically presupposes  $\psi$ ”. The problem raised from the perspective of the

negation test is whether presuppositions survive the change of logical operators and connectives; in other words, it is the problem of projection.

In order to solve this problem the study investigates the various mechanisms of setting up and instantiation of presuppositions within discourse. From among these mechanisms, the mechanism of cumulative hypotheses (a complex proposition's set of presuppositions consists in a single elementary presupposition belonging to a subproposition) is being discussed, as an example. Departing from this mechanism, I show that the problem of projection was moulded through the following trivalent scheme, known as Bochvar's internal scheme, or as Kleene's loose scheme, being an indicator of the difficulties regarding the definitions formulated in terms of implication:

$\wedge \psi$	$t$	$f$	$*$	$\varphi \rightarrow \psi$	$t$	$f$	$*$
$t$	$t$	$f$	$*$	$t$	$t$	$f$	$*$
$f$	$f$	$f$	$*$	$f$	$t$	$t$	$*$
$*$	$*$	$*$	$*$	$*$	$*$	$*$	$*$

  

$\varphi \wedge \psi$	$t$	$f$	$*$	$\varphi \neg \psi$	$t$	$f$
$t$	$t$	$t$	$*$	$t$	$f$	
$f$	$t$	$f$	$*$	$f$	$t$	
$*$	$*$	$*$	$*$	$*$	$*$	

The definition of propositions strictly as logical implications of the explicit discourse is considered unsatisfactory not only from the perspective of the actual developments in logic, but also from the broader philosophical perspective. Philosophically, it is yet considered that logical definitions – classical and non-classical – elude “the distinct metaphysical views” of discourse within which presuppositions are tacitly incorporated. As seen above, the solution advanced in the thesis is centred in emphasising the generally epistemological aspect within the nature of presuppositions and in their rather functional than structural, characterising.

This way can the claim, often present in the specialised literature, that they do not work only as *a priori* elements, but as *a posteriori elements*, too, be justified. The thesis also shows that from this perspective – metatheoretical in essence – presuppositions were understood as “metaphysical creations, not logical implications, axiological settings, not epistemological reenactments, philosophical initiatives, not cognitive findings”. Starting from such interpretations the study maintains that the presuppositional engagement consists in the

discursive intuition of presuppositions: either by acts' propositional content (that is, *semantic*), or by presuppositional acts per se of belief's type (obviously *pragmatic*).

In the former case, the presuppositional (*tacit*) content of the acts is added to the propositional (*explicit*) one, being pre-eminently existential and giving them a contradictory aspect in the eyes of those who don't share the same ontological commitment or truth conditions (for example, for the elementary acts  $F[p \ \& \ (p \rightarrow q) \ \& \ (\neg p \rightarrow q)]$ , where  $q$  represents the presuppositional content, and  $(p \rightarrow q) \ \& \ (\neg p \rightarrow q)$  the relation of presupposing). In the latter case, the place of truth conditions is taken by the success or/and satisfaction, conditions of the speech acts, the ontological commitment referring not as much to the metaphysical assumptions about an external world, as to the actions based on belief and fulfilled according to an end.

Among the presuppositional commitments, the ontological one is paid special attention from two reasons: it is realised through the existential presuppositions (which represent the prototype of any genre of proposition) and represented the object of approaches proper to the speech act theory (departing from which the distinction between tacit rationality and explicit rationality was made). In my study the ontological commitment is understood as determining the types of entities which can and must exist if the statements of a person (or theory) are true. I deem that the various interpretations given in the specialised literature to this type of commitment distinguish from one another by the role they ascribe to syntactical constructions in its realisation and trespass either by ignoring the presuppositional phenomenon, or by its incorporation into already constituted theories.

The final conclusions can be briefly outlined as follows:

- 1) The presuppositional relations represent the core of the various mechanisms of instantiation (the relation of presupposing) and setting up (the relation of presuppositing) of propositions within the scientific discourse;
- 2) The presuppositions' ingredients that hallmark scientific discourse are mainly epistemological (for example, the methodological *themata*, hypotheses, laws, principles) and logical-linguistic (pertaining to the genre of supposition, negation, interrogation, illocutives, factives, felicitives, etc.) in character, being often used as criteria of their classification;
- 3) Presuppositions explain the phenomenon of merging of knowledge and beliefs, of doxastic, or "credales" and cognitive, states, etc., retrieving discursively the epistemic attitudes and thus conferring a new status upon knowledge;

- 4) The ontological presuppositions express fundamental commitments of a different order regarding reality, existence, or being, and led not only to the stratification (on different layers: descriptive, explicative, interpretative) of the ontological discourse per se, but of any type of discourse;
- 5) Any type of discourse engages its upholders (researchers, scientific communities, educators, educated, etc.) both with respect to the world or its realms (that is, ontologically) and with respect to their theories, beliefs, and behavioural acts regarding the reality (that is, epistemologically) and to the instruments that make these possible (that is, logical-methodologically); all these relations presuppose a valuational (that is, axiological) component, either tacit, or explicit;
- 6) The commitments of this type are the minimal expression of human rationality, particularly scientific rationality, for they are one with the multiple relations humans establish throughout their lives.

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